


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JULY 1936

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HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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GOD AND THE MORAL LAW

JAMES BISSETT PRATT

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

THE subject for our annual conference¹ this year — Ethics and Theology — forces us to face one of the most difficult problems of religious thought, — the relation between God and morality. To this problem several solutions — all quite familiar — have been proposed and it will not be the purpose of my paper to suggest a new one of my own. In fact, as the sequel will show, I am very uncertain whether any completely satisfactory solution to the problem be possible. My aim is the much less ambitious one of placing the matter, with some of its difficulties, before the Society for discussion, in the hope that your collective wisdom may be able to throw more light upon this dark theme than the Society's benighted president for this year — who is no theologian — is able to contribute.

One of the simplest and most popular modes of conceiving the relation between God and the laws of morality is to equate righteousness with obedience to the divine will. God is good, we are told, and our goodness is to be defined as conformity to the will of God. One relatively superficial and pragmatic difficulty in accepting this view consists in the obvious fact that it is by no means easy to know with certainty what the will of God may be. Different philosophers, different prophets, different religions give us different and sometimes quite contradictory answers to this question. If, moreover, ethics must wait upon metaphysics, if we cannot be sure that malice and cruelty are evil until we have proved the existence of God and have dem-

¹ The American Theological Society, to which this was delivered as the presidential address in April 1935.

onstrated the truth of one of the many opinions about God's will, plainly all united moral effort will be put back many hundreds of years.

The attempt to define morality by identifying it with the will of God has its theoretical as well as its pragmatic difficulties. Few thinkers in our day are likely to attempt an answer to our question concerning the content of the divine will by citing the authority of the Scriptures or of the Ten Commandments. The days of absolute authority are past. It may, however, be suggested that in the life and teachings of Jesus Christ, whom all Christians and large numbers of non-Christians accept as the supreme type of moral goodness, we have a way of discovering the nature of the divine will in no way dependent on authority, and acceptable to unprejudiced men of all religions. Jesus, the one perfect man among all the sons of men, was unique: and hence it would be at least a rationally justifiable faith which should see in his life and his teaching the human expression of the will of God. It is not unnatural that this argument should have a wide appeal, and nearly all of us, I think, would gladly find in it the solution of our problem. It is therefore a bit disappointing to note that this comforting answer begs the entire question. For be it recalled that our original problem was the definition of morality by means of the will of God. Now the proposed solution, so far as it does anything, defines the will of God by means of morality. The only reason why Jesus is thought to represent and express, in unique fashion, the divine will, is because he is conceived as uniquely good. That means, of course, that we have *antecedently* a conception of moral goodness to which he conforms and but for which the assertion of his goodness would be meaningless. The unique goodness of Jesus, if we know what we mean by it, may conceivably be used to indicate to us the divine will; the divine will cannot be used to indicate the unique goodness of Jesus. In short this, and I believe every other, attempt to use the will of God as a criterion for defining morality will be found on analysis to be based either on dogmatism or on a *petitio principii*.

It may be said, however, that while the will of God is not capable of being used as a practical criterion of moral goodness,

it is still possible that in reality it is, even though unknown by us, the fundamental principle of righteousness. Even in human courts of justice ignorance of the law is no excuse for transgression of it. Our uncertainty as to what the will of God may be need not make it the less true that conformity to it constitutes moral goodness. When the position is put in this fashion the question at once arises whether God wills a given form of conduct because it is good, or whether it is good because God wills it. And the necessary answer is of course immediately obvious. The upholder of what we may call the will of God theory of ethics is precluded from saying that God wills an act because it is good; for that answer would assume that morality is definable antecedently to God's will. He is therefore bound to say that an act is good because and only because God wills it. It is in this form, as a matter of fact, that the clear thinking upholders of the doctrine in question — I have in mind notably Augustine and Calvin — have viewed the matter and have expressed themselves.

The doctrine, therefore, amounts to this: that the word "goodness" is to be defined as that which God wills, no matter what it may be. The assertion that God is good becomes thus a redundancy, amounting only to the undeniable proposition that He wills what He wills. Doubtless this is a possible position. There is an element of the arbitrary in all definitions: and one may, fairly enough, propose a new meaning for an old term provided one gives due notice of the new use and remains consistent with one's self. But while this is true, it is plain that if we accept the new meaning assigned to the term "moral goodness," we shall be precluded from showing that there is any obligation of any sort upon anyone for being morally good. The new definition has, indeed, successfully united "goodness" to the will of God, but only at the cost of severing it completely from what is commonly known as moral obligation and from the rationally justifiable way to live. We grant, if you insist upon your terminology, that moral goodness equals, or is to be defined as, obedience to the will of a Being who is to be called good in no other sense than that He wills what He wills (which also the devils do); but we want to be shown what obligation there is upon us

to be good in this sense; or how obedience to this will (which for ought that the argument can show may be what we know as cruel and tyrannical) can be called rational or conducive to the values which we know as good. And you cannot successfully answer us unless you go over to some other ethical criterion — to some criterion which will put more content into moral goodness than mere obedience to a will which only by meaningless tautology can be called good.

The dependence of morality upon the will of God is put in a slightly different form by the so-called theology of Crisis; but the criticisms just cited against the Calvinistic formulation of that theory hold none the less decisively for it. According to the Crisis theology, as I understand it, there is but one essentially good act for man, and that is complete surrender to the will of God. It is not suggested — and could not consistently be suggested — that our duty thus to surrender is based upon or derived from the fact that God is good. God is God: that is all we know or need to know. God is separated from man by the chasm which it is heresy to deny. And human goodness, properly understood, is to be defined as the surrender of self-will and the correlative acceptance of the will of God, *whatever this may be*. Plainly such a view not only is open (as I have pointed out) to all the criticisms of the general doctrine thus far considered: it also suffers from the essentially anti-ethical corollary that this self-surrender (man's only good act) is never man's act at all, but the act of God alone. Man's sole moral act thus turns out to be no act of his but rather something that is done to him. This denial of the free choice of the good, and therefore of moral responsibility and of the very possibility of human goodness, is a striking and natural (though not a necessary) *reductio ad absurdum* of the attempt to define moral goodness solely by reference to God's will. I conclude, therefore, that ethics cannot wait upon theology.

The objection may be made that in my argument I have presented a crude theology and a far too anthropomorphic God; and it is possible to insist that while morality cannot be derived from this kind of deity, it may well be derived from a more inclusive and more philosophical type of God or Absolute,

and that though ethics need not wait upon the somewhat naïve type of theology suggested, it may and does and must wait upon a tenable and profound metaphysics. Goodness, it is said, — and Beauty as well — is an objective value, in no wise dependent upon subjective conditions, and in no wise man-made. It is a standard or ideal, and as such it is absolute and possesses objective validity of such a sort that we as rational beings ought to conform to it. The obligation resting upon us is absolute. Morality is thus no merely human affair, nor is it to be known in simple empirical fashion. It bears upon its face an unescapable necessity and is derived from the fundamental nature of Reality as such — in other words from God. Thus ethics is dependent upon metaphysics, or, what is the same thing, upon a truly philosophical theology. "In bringing value into existence," writes Dr. Sorley, "the individual person is conscious of a standard or ideal which has validity as a guide for his personal endeavor, or an obligation which rests upon him. The attainment of value is recognized as a value only because of its conformity with this standard of law or value, or because of its approximation to this ideal of value. It follows therefore that the value or goodness actually achieved in personal life implies as its ground or condition a standard or ideal of goodness. Accordingly we are compelled to form the conception of an ideal good or of a moral order, which, as the condition of actualized goodness, must also be regarded as in some sense having objective reality. . . . Ultimate reality must include it. By ultimate reality is not meant material existents or even the realm of persons, but that which is the ground of everything that is real. . . . The recognition of the moral order and of its relation to nature and to man, involves the acknowledgment of the Supreme Mind or God as the ground of all reality."¹

The difficulties under which this doctrine suffers are the general difficulties which the whole Kantian point of view in ethics has to face. These, as I see them, are vagueness, lack of specific content, and the substitution of words for clear thought. In the first place the notion of an absolute obligation owes what persuasive quality it possesses to its indefiniteness. If someone

¹ *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, pp. 508-514.

challenges the obligation and asks for proof, it is hard to see what reply can be given save recourse to dogmatic authority or "intuition." And if the intuition and the authority are not acknowledged, nothing more can be said. Moreover, if it be true that I am under obligation, the obligation must be specific. If I really *ought* to do something, there must be something definite that I ought to do. A mere obligation in general is meaningless. Similarly a *standard* must be specific if it is to be a standard. It must be namable and definable: a standard of specific conduct, a definite principle of action for human beings. Otherwise it is nothing but words. Now if the standard and the obligation are specific they must be relevant to, applicable to, and in part derived from human nature, human values, and human conduct. It is human conduct that the principles of ethics are *about*. A meaningful moral principle or standard cannot be derived from some Idea of Obligation as such. If it is to have content which in any intelligible sense is really relevant to human conduct it must be dependent for its nature on man and his values. It can no more be derived from the ultimate nature of Reality than from the will of an anthropomorphic God. An ethics that has nothing specific to say about human conduct reduces to the tautology that we ought to do what we ought to do. An ethics that *has* something *specific* to say — an ethics that possesses content and is capable of being in any way a guide to action or a means of distinguishing good conduct from bad — can wait upon metaphysics as little as it can upon theology.

The attempt to set up a Realm of Values that shall be eternal, objective, self-existent, and independent of human life and of finite experience, not only shares all the difficulties of an extreme Platonic realism which would make essences and universals "real" in some unspecified and mythological sense: it must also face the dilemma of either giving its values no distinctive meaning, or else of deriving their meaning altogether from the actual world of which they are said to be independent. An example of the first of these difficulties is to be found in Windelband's position, which, in effect, tells us that the thing we ought to do is the Good, and then defines the Good as the thing we ought to do. While such an attitude toward values plainly

makes ethics incapable of speech, the other horn of the dilemma presents difficulties no less great. Hartmann, for example, in the first volume of his (translated) *Ethics* removes values to a purely subsistent and ideal realm, even more remote from human experience than are the essences of mathematics, and insists upon their self-existence, objectivity, and utter independence. Things and experiences are good only because of their relation to values; and values get none of their nature from their relation to desire or liking. "Nothing," he tells us, "is ever loved or striven for except for the sake of some value immediately discerned. But conversely, never is loving or striving presupposed in the case of a thing that is of value. That this relationship is irreversible lies in the very constitution of acting, loving, desiring. It is essentially a one-sided dependence. But what is evident in it is the fact that values possess the character of genuine essences, the character of absoluteness, of principles, and that the knowledge which we have of them can be no other than aprioristic knowledge." ¹

Values, therefore, as Hartmann insists in his first volume, are in no wise dependent for their being or nature upon desire or any other human or existential state or condition and are known *a priori*. When, however, in Volume II the question is raised what specifically these values may be, which are so absolutely self-existent and independent of all actuality, the list presented us contains Life, Consciousness, Activity, Suffering, Freedom of the Will, Happiness, Material Goods, Traffic, Language, Education, All Mental Goods — and even such specialized things as "the spiritual value of the house where one was born." Surely Stanton Coit, Hartmann's translator, showed an admirable prudence in putting into separate volumes these extraordinarily antithetical assertions; one would think that when mixed, even in a German volume, they would constitute a quite irresistible explosive.

As I see it, therefore, it is not possible to derive morality from a non-empirical and independent Realm of Ideas or Values; and this holds whether we make our hypothetical values entirely self-existent and independent, or place them, somehow, within

¹ Vol. I, p. 189.

the mind of God. In neither case can we derive ethics from metaphysics; in neither case can we derive morality from God's mind or will. And not only so. If it were possible and if we succeeded in the attempt so to derive moral goodness, we should be precluded, as we have seen, from maintaining in any significant sense that God is good. He might indeed be "good" in the unspecified and distinctly non-human sense of Sir William Hamilton or Mr. Mansel; but, as John Stuart Mill showed us long ago, to attribute goodness in this sense to God is to say exactly nothing at all. But this raises a new and very troubling question: *can* we say with genuine significance that God *is* good? Is it really thinkable that God should be good; and if it be, then in what sense can He be good? I need hardly remind this company of the position maintained by many profound thinkers both Eastern and Western, both Hindu, Buddhist, and (in some sense) Christian, that morality is but a human affair, applicable neither to God nor to the condition of just men made perfect, illumined souls who have passed beyond our realm of petty interests: that when morality is perfected it destroys itself: that, in short, it must be transcended and must pass into religion.

The question whether morality must be transcended, and whether the moral category can in any way apply to the Divine, may well be answered in different senses according to the meaning we attribute to morality. When Oriental thinkers insist that morality must be transcended, they usually have in mind a set of excellent conventional rules. Bradley conceives of morality as consisting essentially in the overcoming of evil, and Bosanquet thinks of it as a realm of claims and counter claims. Now if morality be taken in any of these senses, it is plain that its own complete success would prove to be essentially unsatisfying, or actually suicidal. It is not, however, in any of these senses that I have been using the word. For me morality means the rationally justifiable way of living. More specifically, it is a mode of conduct on the part of persons capable of choosing, so directed as to create or preserve the maximum of value. Is morality in this sense of the word eventually unsatisfying, self-destructive, in need of being ultimately transcended?

There certainly are realms to which morality of the type indicated will not belong. The realm of the purely material and mechanical, the realm of the simply biological, the Platonic world of Ideals or definable natures, Santayana's "Realm of Essence" — are all examples of regions which in one sense may be said to "transcend" morality. Conscious choosers who are capable of evaluating and preferring constitute the essential condition of the moral. But to say that morality must be transcended because only conscious beings can be moral is to little purpose. The real question is whether in a world of conscious choosers of an exalted type, where the evils against which we men struggle have been transcended, morality also would be transcended.

Bradley and Bosanquet have shown rather conclusively that in a world of illumined and exalted beings there would be no place for what seems to be connoted by claims and counter claims, and that when evil has been completely overcome the struggle against evil must cease. Must a morality based upon value also be transcended? The answer to this question will depend in large part upon the type of values which moral life is conceived as pursuing. I think that what is commonly known as "Evolutionary Ethics" — the ethics of so many non-religious reformers — when carefully scrutinized, will prove to be in need of that transcending which the critics of morality have so long insisted upon. Whether the goal set up by evolutionary ethics would be ultimately self-destructive is a question that admits of argument; but if it include only those types of value to which its upholders commonly appeal, I am convinced that it would fail to satisfy the human spirit, and that the finer type of mind, the deeper kind of person, would demand that it be transcended. And the same fate, I believe, would be in store for the consummation of morality depicted by many a Christian reformer of what is known as the Social Gospel type. It need hardly be said that I have here in mind only a limited number of those whose ethics is of the essentially social sort. You all recognize what I mean. For the *Bonum Supremum* is not infrequently depicted in terms that are either negative or essentially materialistic. It will be achieved, we are told, when social righteousness is uni-

versal. There will be no more selfish individuals, no more hunger, no more slums, no wars or rumors of wars, no more quarrels over property, because Science and directed industry shall have given everyone everything that he wants. There will be no more toil because we shall let the machine do the toiling, no more strikes and lock-outs because everyone will be a joint owner with everyone else, no more prisons and police, for there will be no more criminals, no more courts and lawyers, for there will be nothing to go to law about and no one will want to go; there will not even be any more reformers, for nothing will need reforming.

How do you feel about this picture? Certainly it has much that is beautiful, it includes many of the things that the best men of all ages have earnestly longed and striven for. For my own part I can contemplate it only with a sense of depression. Should this consummation devoutly to be wished arrive in our time, and should we know that the sort of thing I have put into my description was the only kind of thing possible for man, my prayer, I believe, would be, "Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace"! And my still longing soul would exclaim with the Psalmist: "I have seen an end of all perfection: but thy commandment is exceeding broad." Exceeding broad because it is written: "Thou shalt not live by bread alone."

In short, the goal depicted by the merely Social Gospel would fail to satisfy human nature and would need to be transcended because it leaves out some of the most fundamental values of the human soul. These are the values of the more cosmic, the more mystic, the more religious sort. No organization of society and no accumulation and ideal distribution of material goods which fails to include the more spiritual values can permanently satisfy man, or be accepted by him as that far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves. And if morality is to be defined as conduct tending to bring about this purely social and earthly goal and nothing more, then it is true that morality needs to be transcended and can complete itself only in religion.

But there is no reason why a morality of value should be limited to goods of materialistic, or hedonic, or any other ex-

clusive type. *All* values that are or ever shall be loved by the human heart belong of right to the moral principle — the religious values certainly no less than the others. I see, therefore, no reason why morality in this wider sense need ever be supplanted by religion — though religion infinitely supplements it — nor why the spirits of just men made perfect, even in the beatific vision (so long as they retain the power of choice), need ever, or could ever, transcend the principles which here and now make possible the distinction between the better choice and the choice that is not so good.

Similarly I see no reason for supposing that God, so long as we conceive Him to be characterized by will and by conscious choice, is above morality or precluded from being good. What reasons there may be for believing that God actually *is* good, or for believing that there is a God at all, do not form a part of the subject matter of this paper. But so far as I can see, there certainly is no reason for asserting that the God of theism cannot be good. As I understand it, He is conceived as limited in His power or His knowledge and also in His being: He chooses and wills, He uses means to ends, He cherishes purposes and brings them about. A being such as this is certainly to be classed under the moral category. And if this conception of God brings complete satisfaction to the religious consciousness, we need go no further in our discussion of the relation of religion to morality.

But the perplexing and somewhat disturbing query will arise in some of our minds as to whether this conception of God does bring complete satisfaction. And however you and I may personally feel about the matter, we cannot honestly deny that to many and many a deeply religious soul, this finite God with His limitations, this God "down in the dirt" whom William James held up to our view, this Jehovah-like Doer of Great Deeds, this Zoroastrian Enemy of the Evil, this strenuous Ally of the good man, this righteous Self among other selves, brings much the same sense of ultimate littleness and confinement and unsatisfied longing that the goal depicted by the merely Social Gospel produces in the hearts of most of us.

We must, I think, recognize within the religious consciousness two factors, which I may refer to as the moral and the cosmic.

The fully rounded religious man finds himself demanding at different times both that God shall be good and that He shall be without limitations — that He shall be the ultimate and complete Determiner of Destiny, the spirit immanent within the total cosmos, and not a Self among other selves. Different men find these two tendencies differently stressed within their hearts. The man whose interests are primarily of the moralistic sort — the man whom Friedrich Heiler would class among the “prophetic type” — longs chiefly for the finite God; the more mystically inclined longs for the Infinite. The majority of Christian theologians have usually belonged to the former class, and they do today. This is true of writers as far apart as Wieman and Brightman. It goes without saying that Barth and his followers belong here. So also do Temple and Lyman and Tennant, and to some extent Boodin.

But, as I have said, there always has been and presumably there always will be a group of deeply religious persons whom the finite God cannot satisfy: and many of us, I believe, when we closely examine our own hearts will find that while, on the whole, the hypothesis of the finite God may be the more defensible, there is still within us a sense of dissatisfaction and wistfulness when we turn definitively away from the Infinite Divine.

What I have in mind may be made more plain if I remind you of the experience you very likely had in seeing the play *Green Pastures*. Jehovah, you will recall, entirely good and immensely powerful, decides to “throw a miracle.” He creates the earth, and places Adam and Eve and their descendants upon it. Years go by, and Jehovah discovers that all is not going as he had intended. He tries to reform earthly matters, but without complete success. Almost defeated, he destroys nearly all mankind by a flood, in order to make a fresh start. He seems able to do anything; yet he is always in part thwarted. It thus gradually dawns upon him — and upon the audience — that he has an environment, that there is being and potentiality besides him, and that out of this surprises come. Toward this formerly unrecognized environment with its unknown possibilities he comes to sustain much the same attitude that we men sustain toward

God. He learns — and we, the spectators, learn — that he is not the Determiner of Destiny after all; and it is brought home to us that only the Whole of things, the Totality of Being, can fully satisfy the cosmic element in the religious heart.

The Jehovah of Green Pastures is, of course, crudely anthropomorphic, while the God of contemporary theism has been carefully cleansed of all crudity and is a very sophisticated Being. Yet it is a serious question whether even He — or It? — can give the cosmical or mystical side of the religious nature the limitless satisfaction that it craves. Let us consider two of the leading examples of recent theology. Certainly there is little enough that is anthropomorphic about Professor Wieman's God — who, you will recall, is defined as "that in the universe which will yield the maximum security and increase of human good when lives are properly adjusted to him. . . . How do we know that it is good?" (Professor Wieman is never quite certain whether God is masculine or neuter, and vacillates between "him" and "it" in a way somewhat bewildering to the reader.) We know that it (i.e., God) is good "because by definition it is that Something, however unknown, which would and which does bring human life to the largest fulfilment when proper adjustment is made to it. . . . We may not know what specifically its characters may be, but we do know that its goodness transcends the goodness of everything else in the universe."¹ God is, thus, far from being identified with the universe or the totality of Being. He is only one type of cosmic behavior, one aspect or tendency or process. He (or it) is "good," not indeed in the fully moral sense as a chooser of the highest values, but in the simpler sense of being good for us to make use of. Of the existence of such a tendency — for that matter of several such tendencies — within the universe there can be no question; but there can be equally little question that the cosmically and mystically minded will find their souls' thirst all unquenched by the contemplation of this demonstrable situation.

Brightman's God comes much nearer to satisfying both the moral and the religious demands of the human heart than does Wieman's. His God is "a conscious Person of perfect good will.

¹ *The Wrestle of Religion with Truth*, pp. 59-60.

. . . He is the creator of all other persons and gives them the power of free choice. Therefore his purpose controls the outcome of the universe. His purpose and his nature must be inferred from the way in which experience reveals them, namely as being gradually attained through effort, difficulty, and suffering. Hence there is in God's nature, in addition to his reason and his active creative will, a passive element which enters into every one of his conscious states, as sensation, instinct, and impulse enter into ours, and constitute a problem for him. This element we call 'The Given.' . . . His will and his reason acting on The Given produce the world and achieve value in it."¹

Brightman's God arouses our worship, our love, and — our sympathy. Who can avoid feeling sorry for Him and giving Him the mead of our genuine fellow-feeling, when He struggles through effort, difficulty, and suffering, against The Given? We know in our measure how He feels, and He deserves our praise, for He is doing His best. So the spectator of *Green Pastures* sympathizes with Jehovah in his gradual discovery that he has an environment which limits him and that even he cannot make a whistle out of a pig's tail. We sympathize and admire, praise and love; but can we not at least understand how many a deeply religious soul should, in the contemplation of this excellent and limited God, feel cabined, cribbed, confined? The sailor of the salty deep, whose life has been spent upon the high seas, may enjoy a few days of paddling about a calm and lovely lake; but if sentenced never to leave its waters, he will feel depressingly homesick for the measureless stretches of the ocean's endless horizons. And many a soul who has heard the call of the Infinite will feel a kind of cosmic nostalgia when we seek to satisfy him with the good and purposeful and finite God.

It will be asked, and it should be asked, what kind of Being it is that would satisfy the religious soul who finds the finite God too small. The answer may well be that he can never be satisfied with any definable conception. The uses of the word "infinite" as applied to God are, as Tennant has pointed out, numerous and often vague. I think we may say, however, that those who insist upon infinity in the Divine usually make use of

¹ The Problem of God, p. 113.

that adjective as equivalent to *totality of being*. For them it is intolerable that God, like the Jehovah of *Green Pastures*, should have an environment. This is another way of saying that for them God must be universally immanent. This means, I suppose, that nature is either the appearance or (in a sense) the body of God; and that between the Divine Life and our personalities there should be an immeasurably more intimate relation than ever exists between two human souls. For those who feel thus about the Divine, the form of immanence in Nature which even Tennant's theism allows is not sufficient. God is immanent for Tennant in the sense that either intermittently or constantly, He acts upon the forces of Nature which He has made, in such fashion as to force them to work together for the accomplishment of His purposes in a way which they would not do if left to themselves. Similarly God's relation to finite personalities is presented in a fashion which will seem to the mystic a little too external. For this type of religious nature God must be depicted rather more as the World Soul; or as the indwelling spirit of the Bhagavad Gita upon whom "this universe is strung as rows of gems upon a thread"; or as the "subtile essence" of the Upanishads, in which "all that exists has itself — It is the True, It is the Self. And oh Svetiketu, that art thou"; or finally, in the words of St. Paul, the Divine must be conceived as He "in whom we live and move and have our being."

And this brings us back to the central question of this paper, from which we may seem to have wandered: God and the Moral Law. The finite God, we have seen, may well be considered moral. Can we say the same of the infinite God?

If we take the word "moral" to involve the cherishing of good purposes and carrying them out by the use of means, it seems clear that morality cannot be attributed to the infinite God. It is important to see the reason for this. As I apprehend it, the difficulty does not lie in reconciling purpose but in reconciling the use of means to an infinite being. The incompatibility of infinite power with *contrivance* or the utilization of means for the achievement of purpose was pointed out long ago by John Stuart Mill. "The necessity for contrivance" as he reminds us, "the need of employment of means, is a consequence of the

limitation of power. Who would have recourse to means if to attain his end his mere word was sufficient? The very idea of means implies that the means have an efficacy which the direct action of the being who employs them has not.”¹ But while this is true, there is nothing, so far as I see, in the notion of *purpose* which is incompatible with the infinite God. Only the purpose must be achievable and achieved by Him directly and exactly when and how He wills it. It is the need of striving and struggling, the postponement of fruition, which cannot be reconciled with the Infinite One, not the possession of a purpose which He perpetually achieves. Such a view, of course, involves the further conception that God does not aim at some far-off divine event, but, instead, wills the total course of the actual cosmic process. His activity would thus not be work which must be accomplished before a goal can be reached, but might better be pictured as Hinduism pictures it, as the eternal play of the Divine. But we shall fail to grasp the real meaning of this Indian view if we take the word “play” to mean childish and purposeless activity. The play of the Indian Absolute is rather the strenuous and joyful activity of the inspired artist, ever achieving the production of supreme Beauty, in which end and means are one.

The upholder of this view of the Divine will of course take a different attitude toward the problem of evil than that taken by many of those who advocate the doctrine of the finite God. The Infinite, whose play the cosmic process is, approves and wills all that happens including what we call evil as well as what we call good. Of course it is not the particular and isolated evil — or the isolated good — that He wills, but the total play or process; and it may be possible to show that what we call evil when taken in conjunction with what we know as good, in all its temporal and other relations, forms a necessary part of a perfect Whole, an unreplaceable aspect of the infinitely Beautiful.

But can it be said that an Infinite Being, who wills actually all that happens, can be good in the sense of an ethics based on value? The Brahma of the Vedanta is said to be *Sat, Chit, Ananda* — Being, Mind, Joy. But the Infinite could be all of

¹ Three Essays on Religion, pp. 177.

these and not be good in any moral sense. In fact the Brahma of Śankara's Advaita would seem to be decidedly "*jenseits von Gut und Böse*." Must the infinite God necessarily be so conceived?

I think our answer to this will depend on what answer we succeed in making to the question whether to Being, Mind, and Joy we can add the character of Love. Can the infinite God love us? Spinoza's God, as we know, cannot. "He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return." For "if a man were to strive after this, he would desire that God, whom he loves, should not be God."¹ Spinoza here seems to me unjustifiably dogmatic. Certainly an Infinite Being (in the sense I have given to the word) *need* not love; but I see no reason why love should be to Him impossible. It is of course understood that love must have an object. But an Infinite Being might perfectly well find objects for His love in those finite minds who, indeed, live and move and have their being in Him, and yet retain enough of individuality (since it is His will that they should) to say "I am I," to choose and will, and to love in return. Such finite persons the Infinite Being might conceivably love as, in a sense, parts of Himself, as branches of the Vine, sharing their life with Him yet partially individuated. Loving His finite creatures in this sense, the infinite God would will their moral development. Just how, if at all, this conception of God could be made to square with the facts of human life it is not the function of this paper to investigate.

To this extent but only to this extent, as I understand it, could the infinite God be called morally good. And I must at once confess it is probable that the man in whom the moral aspect of the religious consciousness is dominant will feel as profoundly dissatisfied with this conception of the Divine as we found the mystic and his fellows were dissatisfied with the finite God. The moralist, as we may call him, will insist upon both a greater independence for man and a more partisan, active, and moralistic attitude in God than the view I have suggested will permit. The God whom the moral consciousness desires is usually a God who takes sides, who struggles against evil, who loves ideals similar to or identical with those that the

¹ Ethics, Part V, Prop. XIX.

highest type of humanity cherishes. The strenuously moral and pluralistic universe which James pictures for us appeals to the heroic in all our hearts — a world insecure, uncertain, where real losses as well as real gains are possible, a world whose greatest power is a “God down in the dirt” struggling against odds, a world in which “the faithfulness of individuals here below to their own poor over-beliefs may actually help God in turn to be more effectively faithful to his own greater tasks.”

The conclusion to which I seem to have been driven is essentially the same as that put forward by Bradley in his essay on God and the Absolute. We seem to be faced by an ultimate crux within the religious consciousness. What we have called the moral and the mystical urges of our nature appear to demand incompatible conclusions. It would seem that we must deny one or the other; yet we cannot give up either without starving a part of our very selves.

What can be done about this serious situation? It is not a situation that should be neglected. I do not think we can find a permanently satisfactory solution by taking the side of the finite or the side of the infinite God and denying altogether the claims of the discarded doctrine. Possibly some large and harmonizing concept, some Hegelian synthesis, may be discovered which will enable us to hold on to all that is of religious value in both positions. But this is a question for theology. And I am no theologian. Such a problem as this it is not for a mere philosopher to solve. My task consists merely in attempting to present, in as sharp outlines as I may, the problem; and having done this, I hand it over to you with my blessing and my best wishes. I am not hopeless that you, and the other theologians of our age, may be able to suggest a solution. Until you do I am content to wait with patience, cultivating in my heart a reverent agnosticism.

TEXTUAL AND LINGUISTIC PROBLEMS OF THE BOOK OF PSALMS

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THE present article contains notes and discussions designed to discover the sense of or to obtain sense from a number of difficult passages in the Hebrew Psalter.

12.8: אָמַת־יְהוָה תִּשְׁמְרֵם תִּצְרְנוּ. Only the Pesh. agree with the M. T. in its very difficult confusion of persons; the LXX and the Eth. Vs. both have the plural first person and the Targ. has the singular third person. As the first person comes in rather abruptly, the third person may be accepted; moreover, it involves the least alteration of the text, as חֲשַׁמְרֵם can then be taken as the remnant of an unmodernized חֲשַׁמְרֵמו 'thou wilt keep him,' since this suffix often has a singular sense.¹ The antecedent is of course the man described as יָפִיחַ לוֹ 'him at whom one puffs' in v. 6, and the obscurity of this expression may be responsible for the half-hearted attempt to change the suffix from the third to the first person.²

13.5: יִדְלֹתָיו. The unusual acc. case may be illustrated by the Ass. *ilī'su* 'he will overcome him;'³ for the Ass. *li'ū* 'to be able' elsewhere takes the infinitive of a verb in the acc. case as its direct object, and so it has a sense not unlike that of the Hebr. יָכַל 'was able' which elsewhere usually takes the infinitive. The parallelism between the two languages therefore suggests that the text is here correct.

17.1: שָׁמַעַתָּה יְהוָה צֶדֶק. I take צֶדֶק adverbially as meaning 'in righteousness,' which removes the necessity of altering יְהוָה to אֵל, as in צִוִּיתָ צֶדֶק עַדְחִיךָ 'thou hast commanded thy testimonies in righteousness.'⁴

¹ Cf. Ps. 11.7 (84.6).

² For מִכְהַרְרוֹ זֶה לְעוֹלָם s. JTS, 31, 148.

³ Kraus, *Phys. Om. Bab.*, 86.123; cf. Schroeder, *Va. Sd.* 16.12.7 (*iltihunāti* 'he has prevailed over us') and Chiera, *JEN*, 3.368.10 (*iltēšunūti* 'he has prevailed over them').

⁴ Ps. 119.138.

17.4-5: אַרְחוֹת פְּרִיץ: תִּמְךָ אֲשֶׁרִי בְּמַעְגְלוֹתֶיךָ בְּלִנְמוֹטוֹ פָּעָמִי. Rhythmically, as Buhl⁵ has seen, these verses are wrongly divided in the M. T. and must be read אַרְחוֹת פְּרִיץ תִּמְךָ אֲשֶׁרִי בְּמַעְגְלוֹתֶיךָ בְּלִנְמוֹטוֹ פָּעָמִי; but, even so, אַרְחוֹת פְּרִיץ cannot be right, as it does not properly balance מַעְגְלוֹתֶיךָ. I have, however, already shown that there is a Hebr. פָּרַץ 'ordained, commanded' (Acc. *parāṣu* 'to ordain,' Arab. فرض 'ordained'),⁶ and I therefore here propose אֶרַח תִּפְרֹץ אֲשֶׁרִי 'my footsteps hold fast to the path (which) thou dost ordain';⁷ and this reading is partly supported by one Hebrew manuscript which has אֶרַח in place of אַרְחוֹת.

18.27: עִמְנֹכֶר תִּתְבָּר וְעַם-עֲקֹשׁ תִּתְפָּל, var. עַם נֹכֶר תִּתְבָּר וְעַם עֲקֹשׁ תִּתְפָּל in II Sam. 22.27. The first necessity is to obtain a sense for בָּרַר parallel to that of עֲקֹשׁ and פָּתַל, and the Syr. ܒܪܝܬܐ *simplex*, *imperitus*,⁸ and the Arab. بَرِي 'wild, savage'⁹ suggest what these may be, and these seem to be cognate with the Syr. ܒܪܝܬܐ *terra inculta; stultus, simplex*¹⁰ and the Targ. Aram. בור 'uneducated, boorish,' or 'rude man, idiot,'¹¹ and the Arab. بؤس 'worthless fellow';¹² all indeed go back to the common \sqrt{br} meaning primarily 'outside,' especially outside the city, and then 'uncultivated' or 'wild.' Moreover, a Bibl. Hebr. בור (= בור) seems to occur in לָבַר הוֹדַעַת חֲשִׁיה (as read for M. T.'s לָרַב in Ms. Kenn. 82) 'thou hast taught sound wisdom to the boor' (Jb. 26.3).¹³ The verse under discussion will accordingly mean 'with him that behaveth himself boorishly¹⁴ thou showest thyself boorish, and with the crooked man showest thyself tortuous.' As all the Vss. support the consonants of the M. T. this explanation may be preferred to any emendation hitherto proposed, while all

⁵ In Kittel's Bibl. Hebr., Lib. Psalm.,³ 10.

⁶ In JTS, 23, 72-73; 25, 178; 32, 365.

⁷ Cf. Wutz, Die Psalmen, 313.

⁸ Brockelmann, Lex. Syr.,² 88.

⁹ Hava, Arab.-Engl. Dict.,² 26.

¹⁰ Brockelmann, Lex. Syr.,² 63.

¹¹ Levy, Ch. Wtb., I, 86-7.

¹² Hava, Arab.-Engl. Dict.,² 51.

¹³ Cf. Beer in Kittel's Bibl. Hebr., Lib. Psalm.,³ 29.

¹⁴ Cf. נָקַל 'showed itself swift' (Is. 30.16).

other explanations based on the consonantal text fail through disregard of the parallelism of thought. In Ps. 18 both נבר (Ni.) and חתברר (Hithpa.) are clearly normal Hebrew forms from a geminate verb; in II Sam. 22 the Massoretes, misunderstanding חתבר and חתפל, vocalized them חתבֿר and חתפֿל, namely in the Aramaic fashion as respectively the Ittaphal of בור 'to be boorish'¹⁵ and the Ithpa'al of תפל 'was unseemly,'¹⁶ both with the final vowel lengthened in pause. Probably חתברורו and חתפּוּתוּל ought to be restored, especially as the Vss. agree in using the same roots in both recensions of both clauses.

18.35: וְנִתְּחָה קֶשֶׁת־זָחוּשָׁה וְרוּעוֹתֶי. All editors agree that נִתְּחָה cannot come from נָחַת 'descended,' but there is no such agreement on the remedy. Is it possible to refer נִתְּחָה to נָחָה Q. 'led,' Pi. 'aimed' (?) on the assumption that it here means 'directed,' like the Arab. نَحَى (نَحَا) I 'directed (the gaze) towards' IV 'aimed (a weapon) at,'¹⁷ and that the phrase means 'and mine arms direct the bronze-tipped bow'?¹⁸ If so, in the parallel text נָחַת must be corrected to נָחָה (II Sam. 22.35), which will be the old form of the perfect tense.¹⁹

18.43: קָטִיט חוּצוֹת אֲרִיקָם. Various Hebrew Mss. have אֲרִיקָם for אֲרִיקָם as in II Sam. 22.43, where too both readings are found; but Aq.'s ἐκκενώσω shows that אֲרִיקָם is an early reading. If then this is a late spelling of אֲרָקָם, the Ass. *raqāqu* I, 'to be thin, fine' II 'to make thin, fine,' and the Syr. ܐܪܩ Aph. 'beat fine with a hammer' and the Arab. رَقَّ I *tenuis fuit* II and IV *tenuem fecit*, suggest that it represents a legitimate variant recension of the same original text; such derived words too

¹⁵ Like יִתְּחָם from קוּם (Dalman, Gramm. Jüd.-Pal. Aram.,² 317, 326); but forms from hollow verbs often come very close to those from geminate verbs, as in אִתְּחָל from חָלַל beside אִתְּחַל from חָלַל (Dalman, op. cit., 328, 334).

¹⁶ Like Targ. Aram. אִתְּחַל (Midr. on Deut. 1.1); cf. Job 1.21 for the use of תפל in connection with God.

¹⁷ Hava, Arab.-Engl. Dict.,² 756.

¹⁸ Cf. Jer. 12.4 for fem. sing. verb preceding fem. plur. subject (s. Kautzsch-Cowley, Hebr. Gramm.,² § 145k).

¹⁹ Cf. פָּשַׁת (Lev. 25.21), קָיַת (II Ki. 9.37, Kt.).

as *raqqatu*²⁰ = רַקַּקְתָּ²¹ = 'marsh-land'²² and رَقَّ *terra mollis et expansa*, and رَفَقَ = رَفَّةٌ *terra quae aquam absorbit*,²³ are suggestive beside כְּמִיט חוּצוֹת. The text then means 'I will tread them soft as the mire of the streets,' and the fact that the Vss. (apart from Aq.) imply the same verb in the two parallel passages is due not to their representing the same original verb but to the close resemblance between the two roots in meaning.

18.46: יִהְיוּ כְּמִסְנְרוֹתֵיהֶם. As Gunkel²⁴ shows, the M. T.'s חָרְנוּ can be explained from the Jud.-Aram. חֲרַנְתָּ 'fear,' so that the words may mean 'and they came fearfully out of their fastnesses.' What is interesting, however, is the unanimity of the Vss. in reading the same thing, namely ἐχώλαναν (LXX), נִסְמְלִים (Pesh.), *hankasū* (Eth.), صاروا عرجا (Arab.) and *claudicaverunt* (Vulg.) 'they limped' or 'became lame,'²⁵ and this is obviously יִהְיוּ 'they limped' (cf. Aram. חָנַר and Syr. نَسَمَل 'limped') as found in the parallel passages (II Sam. 22.46). As some ten Hebrew Mss. have יָחֲרְנוּ here too, this may be accepted as the true reading,²⁶ while יָחֲרְנוּ can be explained as an alteration due to a recollection of Micah's מִמְּסַנְרֵיהֶם.²⁷

20.6: וּבְשֵׁם אֱלֹהֵינוּ נִדְּלֵל. Does this really mean 'and in the name of our God we will set up our banners,' a rendering for which Symm.'s τάγματα τάγματα διαστελοῦμεν and especially the Targ.'s נִשְׁקֵם are ultimately responsible? I cannot help thinking that the Hebr. נִדְּלֵל is here simply the Ass. *dagālu* 'to look upon, wait for, regard,' which is especially frequent in the letters from Tell-el-'Amârna; for this is commonly used metaphorically, as in *annâte ašmê-ma adgil ana amât (il)Sin bēliya*

²⁰ Muss-Arnolt, CDAL, 982.

²¹ Brockelmann, Lex. Syr.,² 743.

²² Levy, Ch. Wtb., II, 436-7.

²³ Freytag, Lex. Arab.-Lat., II, 177-8.

²⁴ In Die Psalmen, 73.

²⁵ It may be suspected that the Targ.'s נִשְׁקֵם is an inexact attempt to represent the same sense.

²⁶ Cf. Wutz, Die Psalmen, 39.

²⁷ Micah 7.17.

'I heard these things and waited upon the word of Sin my lord.'²⁸ Thus the clause here discussed will mean 'and we will wait upon the name of our God.'

21.10: תְּשִׁיתֵמוּ כְּתִנּוּר אֵשׁ לַעַת פִּנִּיךָ יְהוָה בְּאַפּוֹ יִבְלַעֵם וְתֹאכְלֵם אֵשׁ. This verse as it stands in the M. T. is both ungrammatical and un-rhythmical, but fortunately the restoration of a rhythm of 3 + 3 beats (as in the preceding and following verses) at once restores also the grammar. The first אֵשׁ is otiose as a qualification of תִּנּוּר and unlikely, as it occurs again in the last clause; then כְּתִנּוּר must be corrected to כְּתִנּוּר with three Hebrew Mss., as 'thou makest them like an oven' is nonsense; lastly יְהוָה must be omitted with three Hebrew Mss. as superfluous and בְּאַפּוֹ as a doublet of פִּנִּיךָ or thoughtless padding imported from outside,²⁹ since the pronominal suffix can refer only to the oven, which again is nonsense! The resultant reading will then be

תְּשִׁיתֵמוּ כְּתִנּוּר לַעַת פִּנִּיךָ אֵשׁ אוֹ אֵשׁ יִבְלַעֵם וְתֹאכְלֵם אֵשׁ

thou puttest them in a furnace in the time of thine anger;
it swallows them up, and the fire consumes them,

which makes perfect sense.

22.16-17: בָּאֵרִי דָרִי וְרוּלִי and וְלִצְפֹּרֶקוֹת תִּשְׁפָּתֵנִי. It is clear that rhythmically these clauses go together, probably as the climax setting out what the כְּלָבִים and מְרַעִים do to the Psalmist, as indeed all the Vss. (except the Targ., which has בָּאֵרִי 'like a lion') take it; hence it follows that כָּאֵרִי must be a verb and that therefore either בָּאֵרִי with some ten or כָּרִי with five Hebrew Mss. must be read. Thus כָּאֵרִי is merely an Aramaizing spelling³⁰ of כָּרִי, and a suitable $\sqrt{k'r}$ or *kwr* must be sought; this is the Ass. *kāru* I. 2 'to lop off, shear,'³¹ which the Pesh.'s 'hacked off' supports. In תִּשְׁפָּתֵנִי the person is impossible, wherever the clause stands, while the tense is awkward, but the difficulty is removed by deleting the initial ת as due to dittog-

²⁸ Streck, Assurb., 2, 32-3 (3), 127; cp. Knudtzon, AT, 75, 19; 162, 23.

²⁹ Cf. Deut. 29.22.

³⁰ Cf. קָאֵם (Hos. 10.14), לָאֵט (II Sam. 19.5), רָאֵמָה (Zach. 14.10), רָאֵשׁ (II Sam. 12.1), רָאֵשִׁים (Prov. 13.23).

³¹ Cf. Ass. *uḷātuš dalābiš kuru* 'his privies were painfully hacked off' (Langdon, Creation, 76-7, 1.66).

raphy after the final *n* of מות and so reading שִׁשְׁתִּי. The line thus runs:

וּלְעֶפֶר מוֹת שִׁשְׁתִּי בָּרוּ יְדֵי וְרַגְלֵי or בָּאָרוּ

and vv. 16–17 may be translated:

my palate ³² is dried up like a potsherd,
and my tongue is cloven to my jaws;
for dogs ³³ have encompassed me,
a company of evil-doers have inclosed me;
they lopped off my hands and my feet,
and swept me away into the ash(es) of death;

in other words, the Psalmist's enemies have mutilated him like a dead enemy and cast his carcass ignominiously on the ash-heap, as the household casts out dead vermin.

22.25: לַעֲנוּת עֲנִי. Buhl's proposed עֲנוּת עֲנִי is usually accepted in place of the M. T.'s עֲנוּת עֲנִי, but this involves the insertion of ל, of which there is no trace in the Vss.³⁴ No ancient editor indeed seems to have regarded עֲנוּת as an infinitive form. If, then, it is a noun, it can hardly be from עָנָה 'was afflicted,' which is tautologous before עֲנִי; may it not then be another example of the Hebr. עֲנוּה (or עֲנוּיָה) 'care' = Arab. عناية 'care, providence' (cf. Aram. עֲנִין and Syr. ܥܢܝܬܐ 'care, solicitude'), of which there is perhaps a trace elsewhere in the O. T.? ³⁵

22.30: כִּלְדִּשְׁתִּי אֶרֶץ. As the M. T. is supported by all the Vss. (except the Pesh.) which refer רֶשֶׁן (even though wrongly) to רֶשֶׁן 'fat,' every effort must be made to explain it before having recourse to emendation. The Pesh., however, gives the clue to the interpretation of the phrase, since their ܦܥܡܬܐ ܕܥܡܬܐ means not *famelici terrae*, as Walton translates it,³⁶ but probably

³² I.e. פֶּה for פֶּה' (Ewald).

³³ Obviously 'dogs' stands for 'rogues,' but several Vss. (Symm. *θηραι*, Aq. and Theod. *κυνηγέται*, Jer. *venatores*) suggest פְּלָבִים 'huntsmen (with hounds)'; they at any rate attest the existence of a Hebr. פְּלָב (cp. Syr. ܦܠܒ) 'huntzman.'

³⁴ Cf. Kautzsch-Cowley, *Hebr. Gr.*,² § 114 m–n, whence it appears that the omission of ל occurs only with the infinitive of certain verbs (החל, הוסיף, מהר, אבה, יכל, אחר, היטיב).

³⁵ Ps. 18.36 = II Sam. 22.36 (s. JTS, 31, 282).

³⁶ In *Bibl. Polygl.*, 3, 116.

'those wrapped up'³⁷ in the earth' (although such a usage is not cited in the dictionaries, but is suggested by various cognate words: for example, Hebr. קָפַן 'was involved, intricate,'³⁸ Aram. קָפַן 'bent,'³⁹ modern Syr. كُفِنَ 'arch over cradle,'⁴⁰ and especially Arab. كَفَن 'wrapped in a shroud');⁴¹ this rendering then obviously does not rest on the Hebr. דָּשַׁן 'fat' but may be referred to the Arab. دَشَر I *obliteratus fuit* V *totus se involvit* (*veste*) VI and VII *obliteratus fuit* of which the passive II theme offers so interesting an expression as دَثِرَ الْقَتِيل 'the slain man is buried (under a heap of stones).'⁴² Following the Pesh., then, I suggest that two roots have been confused in the Hebrew dictionaries, namely I דָּשַׁן (= Arab. دَسَم) 'was fat' and II דָּשַׁן (= Arab. دَثَر) 'was hidden, shrouded,'⁴³ or the like. Thus דָּשְׁנוּ אֶרֶץ 'those hidden in the earth' is parallel to יִרְדּוּ 'those that go down to the dust' in the verse under discussion.

25.18-19: רָאֵה אֹיְבֵי כִירְבּוֹ and רָאֵה עֲנִי וְעִקְלִי. The difficulty here is that the *p*-strophe is lost; consequently one of the *r*-strophes must be wrong, although the error is very old, since all the Vss. have the same verb in both verses. It does not seem possible to alter the first רָאֵה but a simple emendation suggests itself for the second רָאֵה, namely to read קִנּוּהוּ אֹיְבֵי כִירְבּוֹ (קָנָה קָנָה) 'look out for mine enemies; for they are many,' and then to transpose the two verses. The Hebr. קִנּוּהוּ is used once or twice of being on the look-out for enemies,⁴⁴ and the error here may have been due to a by-form קָנָה which a copyist failed to recognize and therefore altered to רָאֵה.⁴⁵ The Acc. *qa'û*, *qa(w)û*,

³⁷ Ought it then to be דָּקְדָּס?

³⁸ Ezek. 17.7 (s. Brockelmann, *Lex. Syr.*,² 269 under ܕܩܕܝܣ).

³⁹ Levy, *Ch. Wtb.*, 1, 381.

⁴⁰ Maclean, *Dict. of Vern. Syr.*, 137.

⁴¹ Hava, *Arab.-Engl. Dict.*,² 660.

⁴² Freytag, *Lex. Arab.-Lat.*, 2.7.

⁴³ Cf. Hebr. נָהַר = Syr. ܢܗܪ for the interchange of final *r* and *n*.

⁴⁴ Ps. 56.7 (with acc. c.), 119.95 (with ל).

⁴⁵ Cf. רָאֵה = רוּה (s. JTS, 36, 151-3).

qamū 'to await' attests the possibility of variant forms of the root, and *qamū nakirika* 'the lying in wait of thine enemies' ⁴⁶ exactly illustrates the idiom here postulated.

27.8-9: לך אמר לבי בקשו פני את־פניך יהוה אבקש: אל־תסתר פניך ממני

The only difficulty here is to restore a rhythm of 3 + 2 beats, as in the surrounding verses, and to decide rightly what is direct oration. The solution seems to be to read:

בְּקֶשׁ פָּנָי	לְךָ אָמַר לִבִּי
{ אֶל־תִּסְתַּר פָּנֶיךָ	אֶת־פָּנֶיךָ יְהוָה אֲבָקֵשׁ
{ אֶל־תִּסְתַּר מִמֶּנִּי	

Of thee said my heart,
Thy face, O Lord, will I seek;

'Seek thou his face';
{hide not thy face
{hide not thyself from me. }

In the first line only ו is transferred from בקש, of which the consonants are supported by the LXX's ἐξήτησεν and the Targ.'s בעי, to פני. In the second line, I take אל־תסתר פניך and אל־תסתר ממני as different recensions of the same thought;⁴⁷ the note-line perhaps suggests a doubt about the text, and in any case such doublets are common enough in the Psalms.⁴⁸ Alternatively it is possible to omit יהוה with one Hebrew Ms., and read

פָּנֶיךָ מִמֶּנִּי אֶת־פָּנֶיךָ אֲבָקֵשׁ אֶל־תִּסְתַּר

but the caesura falls awkwardly on this reading.

35.12: כָּשָׁל לִנְפְשִׁי. Cheyne suggested הקשילו נפשי but כָּשָׁל לִנְפְשִׁי 'an offence to my soul,' which rests on the assumption of an Aramaizing noun after the model of the Syr. ܡܕܬܐ 'offence,' postulates an easy apposition and a very slight change of text. The error will be due to the fact that a Hebr. כָּשָׁל is otherwise not found in the O. T.

35.15-17:

וּבְצִלְעֵי שְׁמַחֲוֹ וְנִאֲסָפוּ	נִאֲסָפוּ עָלַי
נִבְּקִים וְלֹא יִדְעָתִי	קָרָעוּ וְלֹא יָדָעוּ:
בְּחִנְפֵי לִעְנֵי מַעֲוֹת קֶרֶק	עָלַי שְׁנִימוּ:
אֲדִנִּי בְּסֵה תְּרָאָה	: ^ ^

⁴⁶ Scheil in Maspero's Rec. de Trav., 19.61, (2) 3 (cf. Bezold, Bab.-Ass. Gloss., 240).

⁴⁷ Cf. Ps. 102.3, which may be responsible for the combination.

⁴⁸ Cf. JTS, 36, 147³.

Such is the M. T. in this famous passage, a crux of which the solution is quite simple; for the consonants, apart from a displacement at the end, are perfectly correct. In the second line נכים⁴⁹ 'smitten ones' may be taken as an abbreviation of נכי רגלים 'cripples,' which both is in harmony with the usage of the word⁵⁰ and will be seen to make sense; and the Hebr. קרע is here used like the Arab. قرع 'rent,' in the metaphorical sense of 'slandered,' as Olshausen has seen,⁵¹ and the parallel חרק supports some such explanation. In the third line it is clear that בחנפי must conceal a verbal form parallel with בצלעי in the first line, and that it must therefore be vocalized בְּחַנְפִּי or בְּחַנְפִּי;⁵² it will also bear a parallel sense, and this can be obtained by assigning to the Hebr. חנף 'was profane' the literal sense which must lie behind its metaphorical application and which is still found in the Arab. حنف *curvis pedibus praeditus fuit, introrsus flexis pollicibus incessit, plantae pedibus pectus inclinatum habuit* and حنف *inclinavit*, whence أحنف *loripes* is derived.⁵³ In the same line the לעני מענו, which must be taken together as one beat, are clearly the same as the Gr. κνισοκόλαξ or ψωμοκόλαξ which⁵⁴ Gesenius cites in illustration of the Hebrew phrase, namely a parasite who earns a meal by flattering his prospective host. In the third line it is necessary with Gunkel to insert שנאי חנם from v. 19, where it is both otiose to the sense and destructive of the rhythm, in order to provide חראה with an object and to complete the rhythm.

The text now runs in a rhythm of 3 + 2 beats:

נאספו עלי	ובצלעי שמחו ונאספו
קרעו ולא ידמו:	נכים ולא ידעתי
עלי שנימו:	בְּחַנְפִּי לעניי מענו חרק or חרקו
שנאי חנם:	אדני כמה חראה

⁴⁹ Most of the Vss. (LXX's μάστιγες, Symm.'s πληκται, Targ.'s מככים, Jer.'s *percutientes*) confirm the M. T.

⁵⁰ Cf. II Sam. 4.9, 9.3.

⁵¹ Most of the Vss. (LXX's διεσχίσθησαν, Aq.'s ξερηξαν, Symm.'s ἀπορρήξαντες, Targ.'s מבועין) confirm the M. T.

⁵² Like לחקשה and לחקיה (Ezek. 30.21), לחקרה (Jud. 18.20).

⁵³ Freytag, Lex. Arab.-Lat., 1, 436.

⁵⁴ In Thes. Ling. Hebr. et Chald. (1829), 997.

but at my halting they rejoiced and gathered themselves together,
 gathered themselves together against me;
 cripples and (those whom) I knew not
 maligned (me) and were not silent;
 at my falling away parasites gnashed
 their teeth upon me.
 Lord, how long wilt thou look
 upon them that hate me without cause?

Thus the Psalmist complains that enemies gather themselves against him and insult him when he stumbles, namely make fun of his misfortunes, and amongst those who thus mock at him are cripples and parasites. Cripples in the ancient world were objects not of pity but of derision, as Juvenal's *loripedem rectus derideat*⁵⁵ shows; the parasite's living is made not by mockery but by flattery, by which he hopes to obtain friends and food. So the natural order of things is reversed and the Psalmist is treated with contempt by the very people who ought to fawn upon him for charity.

38.13: וַיִּנְקְשׁוּ מִבִּקְשֵׁי נַפְשִׁי וּדְרָשִׁי רַעְתִּי דְּבָרוֹ הוֹנָה וּמַרְמוֹת כָּל־הַיּוֹם יִהְיוּ:

Rhythmically the verse is overloaded and וּדְרָשִׁי רַעְתִּי, a tag to supply a subject unrecognized in דְּבָרוֹ (ו), may be omitted with Baethgen; the verse then runs:

וַיִּנְקְשׁוּ דְּבָרֵי הוֹנָה וּמַרְמוֹת כָּל־הַיּוֹם יִהְיוּ:

in a rhythm of 3 + 3 beats. But what does וַיִּנְקְשׁוּ mean? Obviously it cannot mean 'and they laid snares,' even if נָקַשׁ is taken as a by-form of נָקַשׁ,⁵⁶ as this hardly makes sense in view of the parallel expressions; and the Vss., if one may judge from their various renderings, were in doubt about the sense. I suggest then that the Hebr. נָקַשׁ 'struck' is used here metaphorically to mean either 'harassed' or 'reviled,' like the Arab. *نقص* 'struck,' *نقى* I and III 'reviled';⁵⁷ so too the Syr. *ܦܪܝܬܐ ferivit* denotes also *corripuit* (*dolor*), *doluit*.⁵⁸ Thus the verse may be translated:

⁵⁵ Juvenal, Sat., 2, 23; cf. Aristotle, Poetics, 5, 1449a, 34-35 for the proper sentiment (τὸ γὰρ γελοῖόν ἐστιν ἀμάρτημα καὶ αἰσχρὸς ἀνῶδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν).

⁵⁶ Cf. נָצַב = נָצַב and so on.

⁵⁷ Hava, Arab.-Engl. Dict.,² 792-3.

⁵⁸ Brockelmann, Lex. Syr.,² 448.

and the speakers of mischief did tease (me)
and murmured deceit all the day,

which observes a rough parallelism of thought.

45.4-5: חָנוּךְ חֶרֶב עַל-יָדְךָ גִּבּוֹר הוֹדָךְ וְהִדְרֶךָ: וְהָרָדָה רָכַב עַל-דִּבְרֵי-אֱמֶת (וְשִׁנּוּהוּ אֶדָּק). These verses are rhythmically disordered, and to a slight extent textually corrupt, but Gunkel has removed the principal difficulty by discovering חֲלָצִים 'loins' concealed under the impossible צֶלַח; after that, only the vocalization requires correction. The text may then be read

חָנוּךְ חֶרֶב עַל-יָדְךָ גִּבּוֹר
הוֹדָךְ וְהִדְרֶךָ קִדּוֹר חֲלָצִיךָ
רָכַב עַל-דִּבְרֵי אֱמֶת וְשִׁנּוּהוּ אֶדָּק

in a rhythm of 4 + 4 + 4 beats, and this may be translated:

With thy sword girt ⁵⁹ on the thigh,⁶⁰ O warrior,
with thy loins resplendent in thy pomp ⁶¹ and thy splendour,
thou ridest on to ⁶² speak truth and answer justice.

First, commands are out of place in a description of the king's majesty, which is described in the surrounding verses as fact; therefore חָנוּךְ חֶרֶב must be altered to חָנוּךְ חֶרֶב and רָכַב to רָכַב (רכוב); second, the ך of הִדְרֶךָ has been transferred to חֲלָצִיךָ and so the parallelism with חָנוּךְ חֶרֶב requires קִדּוֹר חֲלָצִיךָ to balance it; third, as עֲנוּה is taken with Duhm as an infinitive form,⁶³ it seems that דִּבְרֵי-אֱמֶת must be altered to דִּבְרֵי-צֶדֶק in conformity with it.

Thus v. 3 describes the physical beauty of the king; vv. 4-5 depict him wearing the insignia of justice and going forth to give just judgment; vv. 5-6 deal with his warlike exploits; while vv. 7-8 conclude the picture with the stability and prosperity of his reign regarded as the reward of his manifold excellencies.

⁵⁹ Literally 'girt (with) thy sword.'

⁶⁰ Not על 'רכך' 'on thy thigh,' as the suffix is otiose, especially after that in חָנוּךְ חֶרֶב.

⁶¹ Literally 'resplendent (in respect) of thy loins with thy pomp' and so on.

⁶² Cf. Brown-Driver-Briggs, Hebr. Lex., 754, s.v. על I, f, d for the final force in this preposition.

⁶³ Cf. רָאָה and נִאָּה.

45.9: מְרוּצָהּלוֹת קָצִיעוֹת. Why is the plural קָצִיעוֹת used for 'cas-sia'? Is it an old sing. קָצִיעָה left unmodernized into קָצִיעָה by the Massoretes, or is the word here an adjective 'crushed' qualifying אֵהָלוֹת?

52.9:

אֱלֹהִים מְעוֹן
יְעוֹ בְּהִנָּתוֹ

הִנֵּה הַנֶּקֶד לֹא יָשִׁים
וַיִּבְטַח בְּרֹב עֲשָׂרוֹ

Gunkel⁶⁴ has rightly seen that יְעוֹ comes not from עוֹ 'to be strong' as all the Vss. take it, but from עָנָה 'to take refuge,' which nicely balances מְעוֹן (not מְעוֹ), but he destroys the point of the verse by altering בְּהִנָּתוֹ, which the LXX and the Eth. Vs. support, into בְּהִנֵּה with the Pesh. and the Targ.; for the meaning is:

Behold! the man (who) made not God his refuge

but trusted in the abundance of his wealth — let him take refuge in his ruin!

In other words, the Psalmist exclaims sarcastically: let him who trusts not in God but in wealth trust, if he will, in it; he trusts but in his ruin — and then he goes on to say what he himself has done and how he has been rewarded.

55.15-16: יִשְׁכַּחַת בְּרִנָּה: יִשְׁכַּחַת עֲלֵימוֹ. If נִהְלַךְ is altered to יִהְלֹכוּ with Gunkel⁶⁵ on the assumption that the third person has been incorrectly adapted to the first person in the preceding verse, and the Q. מוֹת (א) is accepted, no other material change is needed; for the text will run

מוֹת עֲלֵימוֹ

יִהְלֹכוּ בְּרִנָּה יְשִׁי(א)

let them walk in unrest, let death rush upon them.

Thus the Hebr. רִנָּה is explained in the light of the Aram. רִנּוּשָׁה 'unrest,' which the Targum uses for the Hebr. שׁוּאָה 'devastation'⁶⁶ and מְהוּמָה 'tumult, disquietude.'⁶⁷

55.19-20:

הִיוּ עֲמָדִי
יֹשֵׁב קֶדֶם

מִקְרָבִי בִּי בְּרִבִּים
יִשְׁמַע אֵל וַיַּעֲנֵם

⁶⁴ In Die Psalmen, 231.

⁶⁵ In Die Psalmen, 240-1.

⁶⁶ Is. 10.3.

⁶⁷ Is. 22.5.

Gunkel,⁶⁸ in part following Ehrlich, reads

היו עמדי	כי־רבים קרבים לי
וישב קדם	ישקעאל ויעלם

which may be improved by altering רבים into רבבים and יעלם into יעניסם, so that the text will run

היו עמדי	כי רבבים קרבים לי
וישב(ו) קדם	ישקעאל ויעניסם

for the archers are nigh to me,
they are (engaged) with me,
Ishmael and the desert-dwellers
and the inhabitants of the East,

which at any rate makes as good sense as the M. T. The advantage of this reading is that רבב is better attested than רבה and רבבים is closer to the text than רבים; further, while יעם is a narrow term, being the name of a hardly known Edomite clan,⁶⁹ the suggested יעניס is a general term which, though otherwise unknown, is possible. For the Hebr. יעניס, 'ostriches' seems to have meant originally 'dwelling on stony ground' as the Arab. وعنة 'hard soil' suggests⁷⁰ (not 'greedy ones,' as the Syr. ܝܥܢܝܣ 'was greedy' is a denominative verb based on the known habits of the ostrich).⁷¹

58.8: ידרך חצו כמו יתמללו. Wellhausen⁷² has rightly seen that חצו conceals כמו חציר 'like grass';⁷³ if so, the remaining letters of ידרך, namely יך (as the ר has been transferred to חצו to make חציר), must be put after כמו חציר and be a verb qualifying חציר, just as מים is qualified by יתהלכלמו in the parallel stich. This may be vocalized יך and explained as the Ni. of a Hebr. דכה = דכה 'crushed,' like the Aram. דכר 'crushed,' and the Arab. دك 'crushed, levelled (earth).' The text will then run כמו חציר יך יתמללו 'like grass (which) is crushed down they wither away.' Here clearly יתמללו cannot mean 'are cut off'

⁶⁸ In Die Psalmen, 241.

⁶⁹ Gen. 36.5, 14, 18; I Chron. 1.35.

⁷⁰ Cf. Hebr. צי 'wild beast' and 'desert-dweller.'

⁷¹ Cf. Eisler in JRAS, 1923, 179 on יעניס (I Chron. 5.12).

⁷² In The Book of Psalms, 86.

⁷³ Variant readings are חציו and חצו, revealing doubt about the text.

as though from מול or מלל 'to circumcize' (cp. Targ.'s מתורין) but must mean 'are withered' as the LXX's ἀσθενήσουσιν and the Vulg.'s *infirmetur* (cp. Arab. مَلَّ 'was wearied') suggests.⁷⁴

60.6: וְתָתַה לִירֵאִיךָ נִם לְהִתְנוּסָה מִפְּנֵי קִשָּׁט. It seems now to be generally agreed that הִתְנוּסָה comes from נִם 'to flee,' so that נִם must be referred to the same root. Gunkel therefore alters it to מָנוס 'refuge' against the Vss. which all support the M. T.'s נִם though taking it as meaning a 'standard' (LXX with σιγμαίωσον, Pesh. with 222, Targ. with נָפֵא); it is therefore perhaps preferable not to alter the text but to assume another נִם 'flight' here used in the sense of 'a means or place of flight, refuge.'⁷⁵ The verse then means

thou hast granted flight to them that fear thee
to flee from before the bow,

which agrees with the surrounding verses.

68.5: בִּיה שָׁמוּ וְעָלוּ לִפְנֵי. It is hardly possible to fit שָׁמוּ into the context, especially as it goes rhythmically with וְעָלוּ, and the repetition of שָׁמוּ is harsh. I can only suggest altering it to בִּישָׁמוּ 'be glad' or הִבְשִׁימוּ 'show gladness,' which yields a sense parallel with וְעָלוּ לִפְנֵי. The Syr. ܒܝܗ ܒܝܗ Pe. *suave oluit; placuit, gavisus fuit* Aph. *suaveolentem fecit; gaudio affect*⁷⁶ and the Aram. ܒܝܗ ܒܝܗ 'was sweet' suggest something of the sort, and the metaphorical use of the root in such expressions as ܒܝܗ ܒܝܗ אוריתא and ܒܝܗ ܒܝܗ ܩܪܡܘܗܝܢ שׁוּחֵי⁷⁷ is interesting in view of the parallel verb in the present passage.

69.15: הַצִּילֵי מִטֵּיט וְאַל אֶטְבֶּעָה אֶנְצָלָה מִשְׁנֵאִי וּמִפְּעֻמְמִיקִים. Most commentators are agreed that שְׁנֵאִי is hardly possible, but none has seen that the only possible remedy is to alter שְׁנֵאִי 'mine enemies' into שִׁין (written phonetically שִׁינ in the Aramaic fashion) 'clay, mud,' which restores the parallelism with טֵיט 'mire'

⁷⁴ S. n. on 90, 4-6.

⁷⁵ Cf. נִר (from *nawir*) from the $\sqrt{\text{נדר}}$, and so on (s. Bauer and Leander, *Hist. Gr. d. Hebr. Spr.*, 1, 464).

⁷⁶ Brockelmann, *Lex. Syr.*,² 80-1.

⁷⁷ Targ. Is. 5.20 and Ps. 104.34 (cited by Levy, *Chald. Wtb.*, I, 102).

and מעמקי מים 'the depths of the waters.' The verse may then be translated:

deliver me from the mire and let me not sink,
let me be delivered from the mud and from the depths of the waters.

I had already recognized this Aram. קִיִּין (קִיִּין) = Syr. ܩܝܝܢ also in בור שאון (|| טיט היין ||),⁷⁸ when I found that Gaster⁷⁹ had anticipated me.

71.6 and 15: בך תהלתי תמיד and כִּי לֹא יִדְעָתִי סִפְרוֹת. If בך תהלתי תמיד is detached from v. 6, where it is quite out of place and put in front of יִדְעָתִי סִפְרוֹת in v. 15, a verse of 3 + 3 beats (as in v. 14) is obtained and may then be rendered:

my mouth shall recount thy righteousness
(and) thy salvation all the day;
my praise shall be continually of thee,
though I know not numbers,

יִדְעָתִי סִפְרוֹת can mean something like *novi numeros*.⁸⁰ Yet it must be admitted that this is a mere guess; yet I suspect that the same usage occurs in

ומושלים במשמרותם
נושאי משל בכחב

חכמי שיח בספרותם
חוקרי מזמור על חוק

Men wise to compose elegy by their (skill in rhythmical) numbers
and utterers of saws by their traditional lore,
searchers out of psalms by rule (of metre),
men who set forth saws in written form.

(Ecclus. 44, 4-5), where the parallelism with חוק shows what ספרה must mean. The Psalmist, then, will continually lisp the praise of God, though modestly disclaiming poetic skill.

72.16: יְהִי פִסְתִּיבֵּר בְּאַרְץ. There can be no objection to a Hebr. פסה 'lot' and then 'plenty,' which is simply an Aramaism, being identical with the Syr. ܠܘܬ and ܠܘܬܬ 'lot,' with which the Jud.-Aram. פיסא *gleba* is connected;⁸¹ the origin of the root, however, appears to be quite unknown, since only late and

⁷⁸ Ps. 90.3.

⁷⁹ In JRAS, 1932, 883.

⁸⁰ Cf. *numeros meminī si verba tenerem* (Verg. Ecl., 9, 45).

⁸¹ Brockelmann, Lex. Syr.,² 580.

obviously derivative verbs are otherwise known. The Pesh.'s 22.55 פסה more or less agrees with this explanation of the word.

77.7: נִינְתִי בַלִּילָה עִם־לִבִּי אֲשִׁיחָה וְנִחַפֵּשׁ רוּחִי (as the verse runs after the transference of אִיכָרָה to the end of v. 6 with the Pesh.). First, obviously נִינְתִי must conceal a verb (as both the Pesh. and the LXX take it), for which I suggest נִינְתִי 'I am downtrodden' or 'downcast' after the Arab. II وجن 'beat' V 'humbled oneself';⁸² for, as this root in its literal sense lies behind the Hebr. נח 'wine-press,' it must at some time have existed also in Hebrew. Second, the masc. נִחַפֵּשׁ before the fem. רוּחִי is unobjectionable but, as the sense is intransitive, it must be altered to the passive נִחַפֵּשׁ 'is prostrate,' which is suggested by the Arab. II خفش 'prostrated and trampled down.'⁸³ The text then may be read:

נִינְתִי בַלִּילָה עִם־לִבִּי אֲשִׁיחָה וְנִחַפֵּשׁ רוּחִי

in a rhythm of 2 + 2 + 2 (which is a legitimate variation of 3 + 3) beats and may be translated:

I was downcast in the night,
With(in) mine heart I did complain
And my spirit was prostrated;

for it can hardly be a mere coincidence that two parallel Hebrew words can be explained by two cognate Arabic words having parallel meanings.

80.5: עֲרִמְתִּי עֲשָׂנָה בְּתַפְלַת עַמִּי. It is hardly credible that the verb here is עָשָׂן 'smoked' which, when applied to anger, requires אף as its subject.⁸⁴ Is it not rather the Aram. עָשִׂן and the Syr. ܥܫܢ 'was strong, heavy' used metaphorically to mean 'was obdurate, hard-hearted'? Thus the meaning will be 'how long wilt thou be obdurate in (the matter of)' or 'against thy people's prayer?' and the preposition will have the same force as in such expressions as לְמַחֲקֵי בִּישְׂרָאֵל 'to be

⁸² Hava, Arab.-Engl. Dict.,² 853-854.

⁸³ Ibid., 177.

⁸⁴ Deut. 29.19; Ps. 74.1.

strong' or 'fierce upon Israel' (of God's wrath).⁸⁵ Moreover, as the Syr. ܕܡܝܢ is used in the Pesh. for various Hebrew verbs denoting hardening of the heart (כבד, חזק, אטם),⁸⁶ the use of this root in a similar sense in the O. T. is a plausible Aramaism.

81.16: ויהי עתם לעולם. As an imprecation uttered against those who hate Yahweh it is clear that עתם, which ὁ καιρὸς αὐτῶν of the Gr. Vss. supports, cannot come from עת 'time.' May it then be the Syr. ܕܡܝܢ *fraus, dolus*, and ܕܡܝܢ *perversitas; oppressio*⁸⁷ and the Arab. عنت 'difficulty, hardship, distress; bad, evil, corrupt state; state of perdition; sin, crime, act of disobedience deserving punishment' (cf. عنت I 'met with difficulty, hardship, distress; committed an act of disobedience deserving punishment' II 'treated with hardness, severity, vigour; destroyed, caused to perish' IV 'caused to fall into distress; treated with hardness, roughness')?⁸⁸ If so, the curse will be 'and let their trouble be forever.'

82.8: קומה אלהים שקטה הארץ בייאמה תנחל בכל הגוים. The only possible translation is:

Arise, O God, (and) judge the earth;
for thou dost sift the nations.

The Hebr. נחל here is clearly, in spite of all the Vss., the same word as the Ass. *naḥālu* 'to sift' and the Syr. ܢܫܠ = Arab. نخل 'sifted'; the partitive use of ב is found with a number of verbs of choosing and so on.⁸⁹

84.6: אשרי אדם עזילו כך קסלות בקרבם. The key to the meaning of מסלות must be sought in the parallel thought of v. 5, namely אשרי יושבי ביתך עוד יהללך; for it must have approximately the same sense as אשרי יושבי ביתך עוד יהללך. Both the LXX's ἀναβάσεις⁹⁰ ἐν τῇ

⁸⁵ Targ. II Sam. 24.1; cf. Targ. Gen. 45.5 (בעיניכון) אל 'be not angry with yourselves'.

⁸⁶ Brockelmann, *Lex. Syr.*,² 551-2.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 535-6.

⁸⁸ Lane, *Arab.-Engl. Lex.*,² I, 5, 2168-9.

⁸⁹ Brown-Driver-Briggs, *Hebr. Lex.*, 88, s.v. ב I, 2b; cf. Jer. 12, 13 and Ezek. 22, 16. [Since writing this note I see that Wutz (in *Transkriptionen* 459) has anticipated me.]

⁹⁰ Cf. I Chron. 26.16 (?), 18 (?), II Chron. 9.11.

καρδία αὐτοῦ and the Pesh.'s מִבְּרַכְתִּי בְּלִבְּךָ approximately support the M. T. but suggest that בְּלִבְּכֶם (in which the plural suffix is due to the parallel יהללוך) ought to be altered to בְּלִבְּכֶם⁹¹ to agree with אַרְם; and, if מַסְלוֹת is right, as it seems to be, it may be explained as a noun derived from סָלַל Pi. 'lifted up (a song)'⁹² and Pilp. 'praised.'⁹³ The verse then means:

Blessed is the man whose refuge is in thee
(and) high songs of praise in his heart.

Such a use of מַסְלוֹת is indeed unique, but so are those of סָלַל and סָלַס cited above.

85.11: צָדֵק וְשָׁלוֹם נִשְׁקִי. Clearly נִשְׁקִי must at any rate be altered with Delitzsch⁹⁴ to נִשְׁקִי if the meaning is 'righteousness and truth have kissed one another.' This rendering, which is supported by several Vss. (LXX, Pesh., Eth. Vs., Vulg.), offers a beautiful figure of speech but is at bottom strange, and one may even ask if it is right. Moreover, the Targ.'s אֲדַבְּקוּ 'clung together' recognizes no such figure⁹⁵ but seems rather to represent an original נִשְׁקִי 'rushed together' or 'jostled one another';⁹⁶ so that the verse may be translated:

Mercy and truth have met one another,
righteousness and peace have rushed together,

whereby נִפְגְּשׁוּ and נִשְׁקִי have closely parallel meanings.

90.4-6:

כִּי אֶלֶף שָׁנִים בְּעֵינֶיךָ כְּיוֹם אֶתְמוֹל כִּי יַעֲבֹר וְאַשְׁמֹרֶת בְּלִילָה:	
בְּבֹקֶר בָּקָצִיר יִחְלָף	וְרִמָּתָם שָׁנָה יִהְיֶי
לְעֶרְבַּי מוֹלֵל וְיָבֵשׁ	בְּבֹקֶר יִצְיֵץ וְחִלָּף

As the text stands, these verses are unrhythmical and awkward if not impossible to translate. Gunkel⁹⁷ has rightly rearranged v. 4 by transferring בְּלִילָה to v. 5, and has then deleted

⁹¹ Cf. Ps. 11.17 (12.8).

⁹² Ps. 68.5 (cf. Pesh. and Targ.).

⁹³ Prov. 4.8.

⁹⁴ In Lese-u. Schreibfehler, 73 (s. Meissner in SPRAW, ph.-h. Kl., 1934, 28, 71).

⁹⁵ The Arab. Vs.'s تَقَالَتْ 'met' or 'kissed one another' is equivocal.

⁹⁶ From שָׁקַק; cf. Jo. 2.9, and Nah. 2.5 (s. JTS, 35, 387-8).

⁹⁷ In Die Psalmen, 400-1.

בבקר in that verse and transferred כחציר to v. 6, where he also deletes וחלף, more or less correctly, as בבקר is not wanted twice and וחלף is superfluous after יהלף; but his interpretation of v. 5 goes astray through his failure to recognize that the Hebr. זרם here has nothing to do with ירם 'rained,' but is identical with the Arab. زرم 'cut (a thing) short, stopped.'⁹⁸ If then

כיום אחמול כיי'עבר:	כייאלף שנים בעי'יך
שנה יהיו ותלפו or ותלפיו	ואשמורה בלילה זרמתם
לערב ימולד ויבש:	כחציר יציץ בבקר

for a thousand years in thy sight
 (are) as yesterday when it passes,
 and thou turnest man to the dust
 and sayest 'Return, ye children of men,'
 and (as) a watch in the night thou cuttest them off;
 they become (as) a (moment of) sleep and vanish
 like grass (which) blooms in the morning
 and at even is withered⁹⁹ and dried

is read (with the insertion of v. 3 after v. 4 in order to provide a proper antecedent for the suffix in זרמתם, with Gunkel), sense is obtained.

90.10: כִּי־יָחַד הִשׁ וְנָעָה. Certainly the absolute use of עוף 'to fly away' in the sense of vanishing is odd, as also is the sudden change of person; and the ancient translators (LXX and Theod. παιδευθησόμεθα,¹⁰⁰ Symm. ἐκπεταννύμεθα, Aq. ἐπετάσθη, Pesh. ܩܬܝܬܝܢ, Targ. טיטין, Vulg. corripimur) found it equally puzzling. Aq. and Symm. seem to have taken it from עפה in the sense of the Aram. עפה Aph. 'spread out (foliage)'; ought it then to be read וְנָעָה 'and is covered over,' or 'effaced' after the Syr. ܢܥܝܬܝܬܝܬ Pe. involvit, Pa. involvit, obduxit, obtexit; sepelivit, Ethpa. involutus, sepultus est¹⁰¹ and the Arab. عفا I

⁹⁸ Hava, Arab.-Engl. Dict.,² 288. (The Ass. zarāmu 'to overwhelm' appears to be a doubtful verb).

⁹⁹ Both the LXX's σαλτηνυθελειη and the Pesh.'s ܣܠܬܝܢ support 'withers away' for 'מולל' (cf. Arab. مَلَّ 'was weary'); moreover, the Targ.-Aram. אחמולל means not 'was cut off, plucked away' (Levy, Chald. Wtb., 2.15) but 'withered' wherever it occurs (s. n. on 58.8).

¹⁰⁰ Apparently 'we shall be chastised' or 'chastened' from Arab. عَفَّ 'was chaste.'

¹⁰¹ Brockelmann, Lex. Syr.,² 538.

and II 'erased (traces)' (cp. *عفى عليهم الخبال* 'destruction covered them over, wiped them out') V 'was effaced'? ¹⁰²

102.5-6:

הוֹכַח כְּעֵשֶׁב וַיִּבֶשׁ לִבִּי כִּי־שָׁכַחְתִּי מֵאֲכֹל לֶחֶמִי:
מִקוֹל אֲנָחְתִּי דָבָקָה עֲצָמִי לְבָשָׁרִי:

As arranged in the M. T. v. 5 is overloaded and v. 6 is too short for the rhythm and, as *כִּי־שָׁכַחְתִּי* makes no sense in its present position, it may be transferred to the beginning of v. 6; then *שָׁכַחְתִּי* ought probably to be altered to *כָּחַשְׁתִּי* with Graetz, whom Gunkel ¹⁰³ follows, though wrongly keeping it with him in v. 5. The verses now run:

לִבִּי מֵאֲכֹל לֶחֶמִי: הוֹכַח כְּעֵשֶׁב וַיִּבֶשׁ
דָּבָקָה עֲצָמִי לְבָשָׁרִי: כִּי־כָחַשְׁתִּי מִקוֹל אֲנָחְתִּי

smitten like grass and paralyzed
is my heart so that I eat not my bread;
for I am grown lean ¹⁰⁴ through the voice of my groaning,
my bones cleave to my flesh.

The application of *יבש* to the heart is due to the figure of its being smitten down like grass, sc. by the heat of the sun, and so withered, i.e. paralyzed; and this meaning for the Hebr. *יבש* is justifiable as an Aramaism after the Syr. *ܝܒܫܐ* *exaruit* and also *paralysi tactus est, obstrepuit*. ¹⁰⁵

102.24-25: *קָצַר יְמִי אָמַר אֵלַי*. Ley, whom Gunkel ¹⁰⁶ cites, partly following the LXX and Pesh., reads *יְמִי נֶאֱמַר אֵלַי* 'shortness of days is ordained for me,' which makes good sense but is linguistically doubtful; further, as the Vss. all support *אמר* in some form, I suggest *אָמַר*, which may have been misunderstood by the Massoretes owing to the rarity of the form.

118.12: *סְבוּנִי כְּדָבָרִים דַּעְכוּ כְּאֵשׁ קוֹצִים*. Parallelism suggests that Gunkel ¹⁰⁷ rightly follows the LXX in restoring (*דְּיוֹנִי*)

¹⁰² Hava, Arab.-Engl. Dict.,² 484-5.

¹⁰³ In Die Psalmen, 438.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Ps. 109.24.

¹⁰⁵ Brockelmann, Lex. Syr.,² 294.

¹⁰⁶ In Die Psalmen, 440.

¹⁰⁷ In Die Psalmen, 508.

קוצים, but this leaves דעכו unexplained; its sense, however, must be something like that of סבתי. Aq. and Symm. with ἀπεσβέσθησαν clearly confirm the reading of the M. T., and it may be surmised that the LXX too does so with ἐξεκαύθησαν, since being burnt out is more or less the same thing as being extinguished. Obviously however the verb here is not 'was extinguished,' which makes no sense; may it not, however, be another Hebr. דעך Pô. cognate with the Arab. دَعَكَ III 'contended pertinaciously with, applied oneself to'?¹⁰⁸ Thus

they surround me as bees (surround) wax,
they attack me as fire (attacks) thorns,

will be the sense; the figure is that of fire relentlessly working or fighting its way though a pile of brushwood.

119.30: מִשְׁפָּטֶיךָ שִׁוִּיתִי. I suspect that שוה is an Aramaic verb used with a Hebrew ellipse for the full שוה לבא על just as שים often stands for על; ¹⁰⁹ if so, the expression means simply 'I have taken thy judgments (to heart).'

119.117: וְאֶשְׁעָה בְּחֻקֶּיךָ חֲמִיד. The verb here is an Aramaism since the Hebr. שעה clearly has the sense of the Syr. ܫܥܐ Pe. *blandiit*, Pa. and Ethpe. *lusit*,¹¹⁰ and the Aram. שעי Ethpa. 'related'; thus the clause means 'and I will be entertained continually with thy statutes.'

119.118: כִּי־שָׁקַר תְּרַמִּיתָם. The sense of תרמית here is derived not from the Hebr. רמה Pi. 'beguiled, deceived' but from the Syr. ܬܪܡܝܬ Pe. *jecit, projecit, abjecit*, as seen in ܬܪܡܝܬ ܠܫܝܒܝ *sibi proposuit* and ܬܪܡܝܬ ܠܝ *curae mihi est ut*,¹¹¹ so that the words under discussion may be rendered 'for falsehood in their purpose' after the Aramaic usage of the root. The LXX's τὸ ἐνθύμημα and Theod.'s ἐνθύμημα αὐτῶν and the Pesh.'s ܬܪܡܝܬܐ support this translation.

119.130: פֶּתַח דְּבָרֶיךָ יֵאֵר. The LXX's δῆλωσις and the Masoretic vocalization of פתח represent apparently a tradition

¹⁰⁸ Hava, Arab.-Engl. Dict.,² 207; cf. Freytag, Lex. Arab.-Lat., II, 34, Dozy, SDA, I, 444.

¹⁰⁹ Brown-Driver-Briggs, Hebr. Lex., 963 s.v. שים Q, 2b.

¹¹⁰ Brockelmann, Lex. Syr.,² 792-3.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 732-3.

that פתח here means 'revelation,' which is doubted by many scholars; but is Symm.'s $\pi\acute{\upsilon}\lambda\eta$, namely פתח, conceivable with such a verb as יאיר? The traditional translation is further supported by the fact that the Ass. *pitū* 'to open' is similarly used, for example in *lūpteka . . . amāt niširti* 'I will open for (reveal to) thee . . . a word (thing) of mystery.'¹¹²

123.4: הלע השאננים הבו לאיונים. The only correction required here is to alter the grammatically impossible הלע (which owes its article to the false analogy of הבו) into the infin. constr. הלעיס; then הלעיס השאננים 'the scorning of them that are at ease' and הבו לאיונים 'contempt for the proud' may be explained as doublets representing alternative recensions of the same text, as together they spoil the rhythmical balance of the verse.¹¹³

140.6: חקלים פרו פרו רשע. It is generally agreed that חקלים is wrongly vocalized. If this clause is taken by itself, the Acc. *hābilu* 'hunter with a net'¹¹⁴ suggests a Hebr. חקלים¹¹⁵ in the same sense, but the parallelism with טמנו נאים פח לי is in favour of חקלים 'villains,' which will be an Aramaism formed on the model of the Syr. *perniciosus*.¹¹⁶ Gunkel¹¹⁷ indeed proposes חקלים in this sense, but the parallel נאים requires a word indicating not a single act but a permanent quality.

141.4: להחעולל עללות ברשע. Here the error is simply a transposition which can be put right by changing ברשע עללות into להחעולל ברשע 'to divert oneself with deeds of wickedness'; presumably the Hithpô with ב¹¹⁸ is substituted for the Hithpa. with ב because that is used elsewhere with a person, not a thing, as object. This phrase thus becomes parallel with לרבר רע in the preceding clause.

¹¹² Thompson, *Gilg.*, xi. 9.

¹¹³ Cf. Ps. 144.14 (s. JTS, 36, 147); s. n. on 144, 14.

¹¹⁴ Jensen in KB, VI, 1, 426.

¹¹⁵ Usually 'sailors' (Ezek. 27.8, 27, 28, 29; Jon. 1.6).

¹¹⁶ Brockelmann, *Lex. Syr.*,² 211.

¹¹⁷ In *Die Psalmen*, 594.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Arab. *اعتل ب* 'occupied himself with' (Hava, Arab.-Engl. Dict.,² 492).

141.5: שָׁמֵן רֹאשׁ עַל־גִּי רֹאשִׁי. For שָׁמֵן רֹאשׁ the LXX have *ἐλαίον ἀμαρτωλοῦ* (cf. Pesh.'s *ܫܡܢܐ ܕܪܝܫܐ*), which does not necessarily represent שָׁמֵן רֹשִׁיעַ 'the oil of the wicked' but may stand for שָׁמֵן רֹאשׁ 'the oil of the tyrant.'¹¹⁹ For גִּי Gunkel¹²⁰ proposes גִּי from the Mishn. Hebr. נאה Pi. 'adorned.' The LXX's *λιπα-νάτω* and the Pesh.'s *ܕܢܫܬܐ*, however, clearly reflect the Arab. *نوي* 'was fat,' so that a Hebr. ניה = ניה 'was greasy'¹²¹ may be safely assumed. The passage under discussion may then be translated 'and let not a tyrant's oil make my head greasy'; in other words, the Psalmist prays that he may not be tempted to accept favours from a tyrant. The form is difficult but appears to be an apocopated jussive Hi. *yany* (cp. יָנִי < *yānî* (cf. *śahw* < *śahû* 'swimming'); but many Hebr. Mss. have ניה, namely גִּי, from ניה = ניה,¹²² in which case גִּי < גִּי will be analogous to אָבִי < אָבִי.¹²³

144.12: אֲשֶׁר בְּנֵינוּ בְּנֹטְעִים מְגֹדְלִים בְּעֵצֵיהֶם. It is evident that the relative אשר is here out of place: at the best, if vv. 1–11 and vv. 12–15 constitute a single psalm, it has no antecedent; at the worst, if they are separate psalms, one cannot begin with it. Yet it cannot be deleted, as the rhythm requires something in its place; moreover, all the Vss. except the Pesh. have it. Is it not possible to assume a slight error in the text and to read 'אֲשֶׁר בְּנֵינוּ בְּנֹטְעִים וְנִי' 'blessed are (we that) our = whose sons (shall be) as plants etc.?' The form of the sentence then is somewhat like that in אשרי שאל יעקב בעירו (Ps. 146.5) except that the relative particle is omitted, and it may be that it is this unique omission after אשרי which has led all the ancient interpreters astray.

144.13: מִזֶּיֶן מִלֵּאִים מִפִּיקִים מִן אֶלֶיֶן. The usual explanation of מִן אֶלֶיֶן as meaning 'from kind to kind' (namely, of food supplied from the general context, since there is no specific men-

¹¹⁹ Cp. Prov. 13.23; 28.3 (s. JTS, 31, 278).

¹²⁰ In Die Psalmen, 598.

¹²¹ Cf. Arab. *هو* Aram. *הוה* = Hebr. *היה*; thus גִּי will be an apocopated jussive form of the Hi. *הניה* = הניה.

¹²² Cf. *חלה* = *חלה*; *קיה* = *קיה*.

¹²³ I Ki. 21.29 (K.); Mic. 1.15.

tion of it) is awkward and forced. I suggest therefore reading מִן אֱלִין 'from food to food' = 'food of every kind,' assuming a Hebr. *zēn* (or *zān*)¹²⁴ cognate with the Aram. וִינָא 'food' and the Syr. ܐܡܢܐ 'supplies.' This suggestion has the advantage of not requiring the alteration of the consonantal text, which the LXX and Aq. attest.

144.13-14: צִמְנוּ מֵאֲלִיפּוֹת קֶרֶב בּוֹת בְּחֻצוֹתֵינוּ: אֲלוֹפֵינוּ מִסְבִּלִים אֵין פֶּרֶץ וְאֵין יוֹצֵאת וְאֵין צֹחֶה בְּרַחֲבֵתֵינוּ. Obviously these lines go together and equally obviously they are unrhythmical in their present form. In v. 13 מֵאֲלִיפּוֹת 'bringing forth thousands' cannot stand beside מִרְבּוֹת 'being brought forth by thousands,' since an active and passive predicate can hardly be applied to the same subject; they are presumably alternative recensions representing approximately the same thought.¹²⁵ In v. 14 אֲלוֹפֵינוּ is perhaps possible although אֱלוֹף is elsewhere adjectival¹²⁶ but ought perhaps to be altered to אֲלֵפֵינוּ 'our oxen,' as the LXX's βόες suggests. Then the meaning of מִסְבִּלִים has been doubted but the Vss. (LXX παχεῖς, Aq. and Symm. σιτευτοί, Pesh. ܡܬܬܝܡܝܢ, Vulg. *crassae*) are clearly right in taking it in the sense of 'fatted'; the usage is an Aramaism based on the Aram. סִבְסִל 'sustenance, supplies,'¹²⁷ which reappears in וִיסְתַּבֵּל הָחֹגֶב 'and the grasshopper shall stuff itself (with food).'¹²⁸ This is really the end of v. 13, describing prosperity in positive terms, and here begins v. 14, containing the negative aspect of the same picture. The only remaining difficulty is יוֹצֵאת, referred by all the Vss. (except the Pesh., which omits it) to יָצָא 'went out' and thus incidentally attested by them. May it not, however, come from another Hebr. יָצָא 'was foul,' identical with the Arab. وَصَّى 'was soiled'¹²⁹ and therefore be cognate with the

¹²⁴ Cf. נַר from *nawir* (or נֶפֶץ from *ḡayib*) for the vocalization.

¹²⁵ Cf. Ps. 123.4 (s. n. on 123, 4).

¹²⁶ Only in Jer. 11.19 (כֶּבֶשׂ אֱלוֹף).

¹²⁷ Cp. Cowley, *Aram. Pap.*, 43, 4; Ah. 74, 205. The Acc. *šūbultu* 'what is sent' means also 'provisions' (s. Driver and Miles, *AL*, 478) with *š* < *s* (s. *ibid.*, 472).

¹²⁸ Eccl. 12.5, where the LXX and Pesh. have respectively παχυθῆ and ܡܬܬܝܡܝܢ (s. Hertzberg, *Der Prediger*, 182-3).

¹²⁹ Hava, *Arab.-Engl. Dict.*,² 873 (especially of garments).

√**ṣṣ** 'to be filthy'?¹³⁰ If so, it is a feminine participle¹³¹ used as an abstract noun¹³² meaning 'fouling.' The verses may then be read

צאננו {מאליפות
מרבבות} בחוצותינו
אליפנו מסבלים:
איפרץ ואין יוצאת ואינצוחה
ברחבתינו:

in a rhythm of 3 + 2 beats (where ברחבתי will have 2 beats)
and be translated

our sheep { bear thousands
are borne by thousands } in our fields,
(and) our oxen are well-fed.
There is no breaking through nor fouling nor wailing
in our broad places.

In other words, the cattle thrive in the plenty of peace in the fields and there are no signs of war, such as breaking through the walls and fouling the streets with 'garments befouled with blood'¹³³ and the crying of people in distress in the towns.

In conclusion I can only hope that even where I have not been successful in solving the problem before me I may have succeeded in throwing such light on it that another coming after me may be able to reach a final solution.

¹³⁰ Cf. טוב = יטב, צנה = وصی and so on.

¹³¹ Cf. ילדת, יושבת, יחרת and so on.

¹³² Cf. 'וָנָה 'oppression,' הָרָה 'ruin,' and תּוֹעָה 'error' (s. Barth, Nominalbildung).

I, 149-51).

¹³³ Is. 9.4. (s. Anal. Or., 12, 60).

JOSIAH ROYCE — TWENTY YEARS AFTER

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‘Two hundred years from now,’ exclaimed William James, in one of his characteristically enthusiastic moods, ‘Harvard will be known as the place where Josiah Royce once taught.’ The approach of the twentieth anniversary of Royce’s death¹ is an appropriate time at which to inquire whether the prophecy — making allowances for the exaggeration of James’s friendly generosity — is in a fair way toward being fulfilled. Has Royce’s work so far stood the test of time? Or must we say that as the experimental interest bequeathed by James increases the calm assurance of Royce’s philosophy must decrease? And with the growing seriousness which practical issues assume have we time or inclination left for speculations about the Absolute? Has not the war destroyed our faith in the world’s reasonableness and forced us to take a less indulgently ‘idealistic’ and more frankly ‘realistic’ view?

Often we say this, but as often we are forced to remind ourselves that the ‘realism’ in which we take pride may have the virtue of looking the immediate facts squarely in the face, but may lack the sustained critical power which is eager to face other facts than those which are immediate. In that type of realism which is content to ‘take things as they come,’ there is a suggestion of an inability to see why they come as they do. As pluralists and empiricists, appealing to what we call ‘immediate experience’ for our data, we may say that our world is shot to pieces and that it cannot be put together again. But as philosophers and religious men we cannot leave the matter here and believe that we have seen through our problem or seen our job through. We may roughly define the task of science as that of setting down what it finds. But philosophy is not

¹ Royce died September 14, 1916.

science and religion is not either science or philosophy. Philosophy tries to extend our understanding of the relations in which our immediate experiences are set, and to give us a view which is both more comprehensive and more critical than a mere record of events as they occur can be. And when it is written in a religious mood, and deals with religious subjects, it attempts to bring insights which shall illumine the connection between a theory of the world and a practical attitude toward it. Because Royce wrote in this spirit and with these questions in mind we turn to him today to ask whether his formula will make it possible to gather up our fragments that nothing may be lost.

The attack against absolute idealism has been carried on since Royce's death with so much of both enthusiasm and critical skill that one hardly expects to see the theory as Royce held it again enter the lists and emerge triumphant. Yet one cannot survey the present scene without a haunting feeling that we should do well to see our problem as Royce saw it and not as do the majority of our contemporaries. Our cult of the irrational, — our concern for the grotesque and demonic in art, the formless in literature, the hysterical in politics, and the 'unconscious' in religion, — all point to a swing of the pendulum which has taken us further than necessary if the hands of the clock are to advance evenly. Our problem today is that of power. We see unsuspected power in nature, in society, in ourselves. We do not so readily see a principle of control. As Royce was always busy with the question of the setting in which the human will is placed, and with an inquiry into the nature of the authority by which the will is curbed, his work takes on special pertinence now. If we were permitted to ask the Sphinx a question, our age would be likely to ask where authority resides, and how form and control can be applied to the forces already active. Are there any absolutes, is reason a naturalistic product, does morality have compulsions akin to those of logic? — on such themes would our questions turn. And here we should be on Royce's own ground.

As we look back at Royce today we are struck by the adequate way in which his work has offered a background for recent

American thinking. A story is told of an Oxford examiner who wrote at the top of a paper in philosophy: 'Give at the start your definition of God and of the Absolute, and say nothing further about them in the remainder of the examination.' What the Oxford students did is not reported, but so far as the Absolute is concerned, American philosophers have taken the suggestion almost literally. 'I have one eye on my own argument, the other always upon you,' James once wrote to Royce, and the remark is symbolic of the silent influence which Royce's Absolute had. Recently Professor Hoernlé has described Royce's effect on those who heard him. 'If Idealism in the United States has suffered a reaction,' he says,² 'this is due, in part at least, to the very force and distinctiveness of Royce's thinking. . . . The stronger minds (among his pupils) were necessarily provoked into either challenging his fundamental principles or else trying to think them in their own ways. Men had to break Royce's spell in order to be themselves.'

But Royce was much more than a stimulating pedagogue. What he did for American philosophy was first of all to introduce, more effectively than any other, the dominant philosophy of Europe, and second to state it in terms naturally congenial to American ears. In this way he set the basic problems for American philosophy of religion and brought out, in his own work, the fundamental dualism with which it has since his time been concerned. We have said that our question today is how our fragmentariness may be made whole and how our drives toward pleasure and power may be made reasonable. Put in the terms in which Royce worked, the problem was that of combining will and reason, discovering the nature of the will that is in us and the power of the authority by which it is controlled. Royce solved his problem by turning, fairly early in his career, though not at the beginning, to Absolute Idealism, and then interpreting this foreign philosophy in such a way as to make it appeal to his countrymen. Americans of his day were interested religiously in the Calvinistic idea of a sovereign God, politically in a democratic ideal, practically in taming Nature. Royce was able to show, through his emphasis on will, that the Absolute

² Clifford Barrett (ed.), *Contemporary Idealism in America*, p. 300.

operated satisfactorily on each of these three levels. The will of the Absolute is sovereign, it is manifest in the democracy of the Beloved Community, yet expresses itself also in the individual life since reality is but the fulfilment of individual purpose. Although his own interests were not ecclesiastical, Royce thus provided established Protestantism with one of its chief philosophical supports. And although himself an absolute idealist, he provided a voluntaristic pragmatism with some of its main arguments. At the same time Royce moved his own work further beyond the bounds of the ordinary classifications than is sometimes recognized. He was an idealist with a difference, a voluntarist and empiricist who yet believed in absolutes. 'He passed for an eminent logician,' writes Santayana,³ 'because he was dialectical and fearless in argument, and delighted in the play of formal relations; he was devoted to chess, music, and mathematics, but all this show of logic was but a screen for his heart.' And James could not resist saying⁴ of *The World and the Individual*, 'It is a charming romantic sketch. . . . I do think of Royce now in a more or less settled way as primarily a sketcher in philosophy. . . . But of course, the sketches of some masters are worth more than the finished pictures of others.'

The statement that Royce came to idealism through voluntarism is based in part upon a comparison of his early and later works. The commonly accepted view is that he began with an intellectualistic idealism, expressed in his two early books, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* and *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, and came later, partly under the stress of criticism, to play up the role of will. The ground for this view is presumably Royce's own statement in the Preface to volume I of *The World and the Individual*, that in his first book the Absolute had been defined in terms of Thought, but that he had himself come to believe that Will and Experience should be given a more prominent place. He would accordingly, he said, base the present discussion on the notion of Individuality. Yet a paper which was read soon after, in 1903, to the American Philosoph-

³ George Santayana, *Character and Opinion in the United States*, p. 101.

⁴ *Letters of William James*, vol. II, p. 114.

ical Association⁵ referred to the fact that in 1881, four years, that is, before the appearance of *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, he had been a pragmatist. An essay on Kant's Relation to Philosophical Progress published in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* for that year contained, as he says, 'a sincere effort to state the theory of truth wholly in terms of an interpretation of our judgments as present acknowledgments, in other words, an ethical voluntarism. When later,' he continues, 'I fell, and came to believe, as I now steadfastly do, that it is one function of the truth to be, amongst other things, actually true, I do not think that I ceased to be, in a very genuine sense, still a pragmatist. . . . I am still of the opinion that judging is an activity guided by essentially ethical motives. I still hold that, for any truth-seeker, the object of his belief is also the object of his will to believe.'

If we turn to some of the early articles we find Royce's statements about himself confirmed with the one exception that 'voluntarism' defines the early views better than does the word 'pragmatism.' Royce does not seem to have shared pragmatism's distinctive interest in the future or in the philosophical importance of other purposes than the cognitive. 'Our beliefs,' Royce wrote in 1880,⁶ 'are always the satisfaction of individual wants.' Beliefs relate to past, future, or possible states of consciousness. 'As such they express the fundamental wants of consciousness. . . . The present moment does not satisfy us; it is poor and empty. It gains meaning only when we view it

⁵ Published as an article, *The Eternal and the Practical*, *Philosophical Review*, vol. XIII, pp. 116 ff.

Royce's early voluntarism has been commented on by Professor Dewey in a paper, *Voluntarism in the Roycean Philosophy*, *Philosophical Review*, vol. XXV, pp. 245 ff., and has been treated more recently by Professor George Dykhuizen in an article, *Royce's Early Philosophy of Religion*, *Journal of Religion*, vol. XV, pp. 316 ff. Professor Howison regarded voluntarism as a later and undesirable development in Royce's thought. Referring to *The World and the Individual*, Howison wrote: 'The nominal Voluntarism I am confident we may safely discount, as inconsistent with our thinker's idealistic view, so far as this is true. It of course savors of the general Elective Theory on which the present Harvard University system is founded, and . . . indicates the subtle influence that James's voluntaristic theory of the psychologic world of "perception" . . . exercised on our friend's thinking.' (*Philosophical Review*, vol. XXV, p. 238.)

⁶ Paper on *The Nature of Voluntary Progress* published in *Fugitive Essays*, p. 112.

as one of a series or as one fact in a world of facts. Therefore if we say that we must believe in past and future we do not in general intend to refer to the "must" that expresses the absolutely binding force of present momentary knowledge; but the "must" expresses a felt need.'⁷ In the article on Kant's Relation to Modern Philosophic Progress⁸ referred to above Royce argues that knowledge involves a reference of the present datum to data which are past, others which are future, and also the reference to other conscious beings. The understanding thus 'gets its cue from present sense, but . . . acts in its own way, actually constructing, body, bones, and soul, out of the little dry dust of the puny present moment, that whole vast world of experience to which Kant had supposed that it was merely to give form.'⁹ In an article on Mind and Reality¹⁰ he goes a step further toward describing this outward reference, becomes less subjective and supplements James's theory of purposive ideas, by which he acknowledges himself to have been greatly influenced, with a Berkeleyan view of what it is that makes ideas valid.

In his first book, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, published in 1885, Royce's dilemma comes clearly to the fore. We need, he says, a voluntary act of acknowledgment, but there must be a stable structure which justifies this. In that remarkable chapter on *The World of the Postulates*, which is as Jamesian as anything that James himself ever wrote, Royce claims that postulates are the very stuff of our intellectual as of our practical life. Science postulates order to bring us out of our native confusion, religion postulates goodness to relieve our awareness of evil. By attending to some sense impressions rather than others we bring order out of chaos. The soldier postulates that he will beat the enemy, the ship's captain that he will get to harbor, all of us postulate that our lives are worth the trouble they take. Since, then, we are all governed by prejudices, the question is not: Shall I be prejudiced? but For

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁸ *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vol. XV, 1881, pp. 360 ff.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 378.

¹⁰ *Mind*, vol. VII, 1882, pp. 30 ff.

what shall I be prejudiced? But then, having stated the case for a postulational voluntarism in this emphatic way, Royce goes on in the equally famous chapter on *The Possibility of Error* to show that there is an 'ultimate rationality of things' and that while our postulates are not superseded, they are strengthened by this insight. No single judgment is or can be an error. Only as included in a higher thought which contains both idea and object can there be error or truth. Therefore 'all reality must be present to the Unity of the Infinite Thought.'¹¹ In *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (1892) the same arguments for a fundamentally intellectualistic view are presented and we hear less about the postulates, though a great deal of attention is given to the romantic movement and the historic chain of events by which it led to absolute idealism. In this book also we detect an empirical and voluntaristic note in the fact that the terms 'Self' or 'World-Self' replace infinite 'Thought.' This reappears in the stress on the problem of individuality in *The Conception of God* (1895), also in the claim that the view presented is theistic rather than pantheistic.¹² Here again the notion of freedom of the will is explained to be compatible with the Absolute, since the latter sets the standards and not the details for the finite will.¹³ In *The World and the Individual* (vol. I, 1900; vol. II, 1901) voluntarism comes more clearly into the open. Here the central problem is that of individuality, ideas are wills or plans of action, the Absolute is the supreme Will. 'The present,' Royce writes,¹⁴ 'is a deliberate effort to bring into synthesis, more fully than I have ever done before, the relations of Knowledge and Will in our conception of God.' In this work, again in a Jamesian manner, Royce lays great stress on the active and voluntaristic factors of attention and discrimination in the knowing process. In *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (1908) Royce makes an approach to an ontological problem from a moral angle by giving the moral principle of loyalty cosmic status. In the essay on 'The Problem of Truth

¹¹ P. 433.¹² P. 49.¹³ Pp. 273 ff. Cf. Paul E. Johnson, *Josiah Royce — Theist or Pantheist?* *Harvard Theological Review*, vol. XXI, p. 197.¹⁴ Vol. I, preface, p. x.

in the Light of Recent Discussion,' published in the volume *William James and Other Essays* (1911), he goes so far as to say: 'I have myself long since maintained that there is indeed a logic of the will, just as truly as there is a logic of the intellect. Personally, I go further still. I assert: all logic is the logic of the will. There is no pure intellect.'¹⁵ Again: 'Thinking, I repeat, is simply our activity of willing precisely in so far as we are conscious of what we do and why we do it.'¹⁶ Absolutism is the form in which the will finds it must carry on its activity. Finally, in *The Problem of Christianity* (1913) Royce defines the Absolute itself in terms of the social process of interpretation carried on within the Beloved Community, concluding his work with a final empiricistic flourish.

As we follow the course of this development we begin to mistrust the adequacy of some of our standard classifications. Here is an absolute idealist with a new procedure. Royce's greatest debt is clearly to Kant, Fichte, Schopenhauer, and James, and the fact that these influences can be combined in one man helps us to see the fluidity of some of our categories. If we dig into the argument of *The World and the Individual* we can indeed see a conventional dialectical scheme. Royce finds contradictions in realism, turns therefore to idealism, discovers that logically one self must be supplemented by other selves, and, pressing his logic further, finds that these other selves and their world cannot exist except as included in a supreme self. In this way we can see the dialectical apparatus at work and can feel that by applying the principle of contradiction and the law of excluded middle the final result is obtained as that which must be so because all alternatives are excluded. Yet we are forced to wonder whether Royce's essential genius expressed itself in just this way. Do we find in Royce neo-Hegelian idealism adapting itself to new conditions and taking on a protective empiricistic coloring in order to escape criticism? Did Royce's philosophical temper force him, in other words, to look first for system, structure, form, relations, and the critical control of mind, — to make these primary, and then to fill in the empirical data drawn from human life? Or should we say that along with the realists

¹⁵ P. 234.¹⁶ P. 243.

and empiricists, such as his colleague James, Royce accepted as the primary datum the living will, especially the living purpose of the human will, and tried to discover the nature of the real through an analysis of the will's mode of operation and the factors to which it was subject? The difference may seem to be merely one of emphasis, yet an emphasis of this sort is important in philosophy, especially at a time like the present when our classifications are losing their former rigidity. In spite of his own application of the term to himself Royce was not a pragmatist. But it is clear that his idealism was of a strongly empiricistic and voluntaristic turn, and it seems plausible that in his own thinking Royce invoked mind to bring order and stability into a world of wills, and did not merely use the idea of will to explain how mind can actualize itself.

Let us now turn back to his most intellectualistic period and see some of the basic arguments on which his idealism turned. 'The marvel of marvels,' he says in a characteristic passage,¹⁷ 'that this being, evolved from inorganic nature . . . should after all *know* . . . such a marvel surely calls for a deeper scrutiny. . . . The lesson is that, in the critical study of just this *knowing* power of ours, in the scrutiny of our most fundamental ideas, is to be found, if anywhere, a key to these mysteries.' This sounds on the surface like good conventional idealism. Yet the fact that Royce drew an illustration from the emergence of mind in the evolutionary process does not suggest that he was working along conventional Berkeleyan or Hegelian lines. It is the practical significance of knowing which here becomes prominent. If knowing is part of the struggle for survival, then at once we become interested in its fundamental practical purpose and the ways of realizing it. Agnosticism is not so much an interesting speculative possibility as an immediate practical danger. We must seek out the conditions which will bring success to the knowing will.

As soon as we have thus defined knowing as practical activity and taken the will to know as the fundamental fact which sets our problem, all Royce's phrases fall into line and the steps of his argument begin the upward journey which leads straight to

¹⁷ The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 338.

the Absolute Will itself. The individual will, seeking knowledge, finds objects which resist or fulfil its purpose. The world must be defined as 'such stuff as ideas are made of' because only in this way can it be made relevant to the knowing will. Matter is a mass of coherent ideas that we 'cannot help having.' Ideas are themselves of the nature of will since they are nascent activities or plans of action. To think an object is to mean it or aim at it, in some sense to possess it. If ultimately we possess it in the Absolute, yet it is a striving Absolute which gains it for us, and one which may even be described as a continuous social process of interpretation.¹⁸ It is only the voluntary commitment of ideas to a selected task that makes them capable of attaining truth or falsity. To be is not merely to be perceived, but to be the fulfilment of a purpose, the external embodiment of an internal meaning. The only possible correspondence between idea and object is that of purpose. The only test of correspondence is whether it is that which the idea intended. 'What is, or what is real, is as such the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas.'¹⁹ The World of Description or of social experience is defined by our own voluntary attention. The World of individual Appreciation is defined by our voluntaristic purposes and voluntaristically determined values.²⁰ Our ideas are thus wills, finding consummation in a supreme will, resisted by other stubborn wills. The wills of other selves appear in response to our own will. We acknowledge particular facts not because of the compulsions of sense experience but because of the 'ought' of which our recognition of other wills is the expression. Our chosen purpose, of which the will to know is but one manifestation, is to seek a homeland beyond ourselves yet of the substance of ourselves. The real is individual, the expression of an individual purpose. The whole crea-

¹⁸ As Royce did describe it in *The Problem of Christianity*. It is interesting to note James's agreement with Royce as to the kind of connection required by idea and object and his own substitute for the Absolute in the form of a series of kinaesthetic motor sensations. Cf. Wm. James, *Collected Essays and Reviews*, p. 276; also *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 22 n.

¹⁹ *The World and the Individual*, vol. I, p. 339.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 106.

tion thus groaneth and travaileth together to achieve individual being after the manner in which ideas achieve their objects. The entire world is the wilful pursuit of a goal, but the process in inorganic nature is slower than with organic nature because of a different time span and different type of conscious experience. The Absolute expresses a unique purpose. Your purpose is unique because he worketh in you. Death is an incident leading toward the fulfilment of your will.

The foregoing sketch will suffice to remind us of the main tendency in Royce's voluntarism. Our next question is whether the more voluntaristic Royce becomes the less able he is to do what an idealist is supposed to do. If we say that our problem today, in ethics, politics, religion, and metaphysics, is that of doing justice both to the will as experienced and to the conditions by which it is made a good will, we may say that we are looking for a view of life which will supplement and correct the relativistic naturalism of pragmatism while avoiding what seems to be the abstractness of idealism. Royce seems at first to give us what we are looking for. But has he gone too far in making will so prominent? Royce's own answer would be in the negative, for his aim, he says, is to give us a picture of a will that is spiritual and different from the capricious will of Schopenhauer.²¹ But what is a spiritual will? Clearly it is one which is dedicated to ideal principles. Yet when these principles are part of the Absolute which is itself will, are they not ultimately capricious rather than reasonable? Or if 'capricious' be too strong a word, must we not say that they are as arbitrary as a sovereign Will in the nature of the case must be? If the Absolute be Thought or Reason it has an answer to our questions of validity. But insofar as it is Will we can only ask: Who made thee a Judge over us? Royce does not reply that the Absolute Will is reasonable where our wills are unreasonable, but that the Absolute is related to us as is the whole to the fragments. If he means by this that the inclusiveness of the Absolute is like the inclusiveness of the relation of consistency, he is back once more at an Absolute of Thought or Reason. Yet he

²¹ The Problem of Christianity, vol. II, pp. 368, 428.

has protested that the Absolute is Will and not mere Thought, so that we are left again with the nature of the Absolute Will and its authority over us undefined. The only clue to a solution is in the suggestion that there is a constraining element in wholeness itself, and that a Will which is all that there is must through the fact of its totality have an effect upon the part. Implicit here is a suggestion of the inevitable influence of form upon content which appears frequently in Royce's work. Yet the difficulties inherent in the view that the many are different because they are parts of the one persist as Royce tries to give instances of the relation of actual to ideal. Loyalty, for example, is a simple empirical purpose, or means to an end. Yet when it is set up as an end in itself it ceases to be a means. The Beloved Community is invoked as an ideal, but its relation to actual communities is left unclear.

We must ask, then, whether implicit in the conception of will itself there is an element which relieves it from arbitrariness, and as we pursue this question Royce gives more and more hints of the answer. What is will? we ask. The first answer is that it is so all-embracing as to cover even so rationalistic a conception as correspondence. What is the test of the truthful correspondence of an idea to its object? Royce asks. 'The only answer,' he says,²² 'is in terms of Purpose. The idea is true if it possesses the sort of correspondence to its object that the idea itself wants to possess.' Yet this is a peculiar answer. Does the idea set up its own notion of correspondence? we query. Is this not anarchy? Royce explains further:²³ 'It is a sort of identity that the scholastics often called analogy, i.e., equivalence merely as to the common possession of certain relationships which permit the idea for a specific purpose, as in a computation, a calculus, or in any system of ideal constructive processes, to act as substitute, to take the place of its object.' Yet we feel that the important word here is 'permit' and the important conception that of the structure within which the idea falls. If the correspondence, Royce continues, is that

²² *The World and the Individual*, vol. I, p. 306.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 306-307.

which the idea intended, the idea is true, if not, it is false. 'Thus it is not mere agreement, but intended agreement, that constitutes truth.'

One notices the delicate poise of the balance between volitional and intellectual factors in this description of the life of ideas, and the complexity of the problem when one sets out to say that idea and will, which to the naive man seem separate things, are actually parts of the same process. If Royce means that an idea is a plan of action, that it is nascent activity, that it points at, means, and intends its object, we can understand him. If he means further that there is neither error nor truth unless there is a connection between idea and object which must be described in terms of intention, we can again agree. But Royce seems to go further than this when he says,²⁴ 'Every finite idea has to be judged by its own specific purpose. Ideas are like tools. . . . To ask me which of two ideas is the more nearly true, is like asking me which of two tools is the better tool. The question is a sensible one if the purpose in mind is specific, but not otherwise.' One razor can be superior to another, he continues, but you can't ask whether a razor is superior to a hammer.

Let us now ask Royce in turn which is the better set of ideas — idealism or pragmatism? The relation of the idea in our question to its answer will be purposeful, but the nature of the purpose will, as in the case of all judgments, depend not on the nature of the idea but on the truth-attaining situation in which this idea in common with all others finds itself. Every judgment, Royce has himself said, is a judgment about reality. What purpose can any idea have but that of fulfilling itself in reality? When the pragmatist affirms a different purpose or defines his purpose in so different a way that a new situation is invoked, do we not say that he is using a hammer where a razor is required? 'The object and the idea of the object,' Royce says,²⁵ 'appear to be related as Hamlet in the play is related to the intent of Shakespeare. . . . Hamlet is what Shakespeare's idea intends him to be.' Yet we wonder at the illustration. The truth-seeking situation is defined more adequately in terms

²⁴ Ibid., p. 308.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 323.

of the search of the historian for the actual Prince of Denmark. The problem of the playwright brings up a special and not a typical illustration of the search for truth.

Just as Royce seems to have overplayed his hand in defining the Absolute as Will and leaving us without a reasonable sanction for its authority over us, so here again, we feel, the voluntaristic note has been struck so resoundingly as to silence certain legitimate intellectualistic claims. Perhaps we should not set up an Absolute and think of it as will, nor emphasize the wilful element in knowledge in such a way as to make it absolute. Yet to make these objections is but to reinforce our conviction that at some point within the sphere where will and intellect merge the answer to our problem is to be found. Does Royce offer nothing further to explain what this merger is like? If we must stop thinking of ideas as passive copies and must view them as active wills, should we not also stop thinking of wills as random impulses and see them as purposes with an organization of their own?

When we put the question in this way the answer flashes back at us from Royce's pages. If ideas are wills, plans, purposes, then wills and purposes must be of the nature of ideas. The will to know is but the highest type of will, and if it is under the control of ideas it is fair to assume that will in general can similarly be found to contain a principle of control. In fact, the more we read Royce, the more clear it is that we have not will and desire on the one hand and norms and standards on the other, but wills with norms implicit in them and standards which are real because actualized in wills. This is a constant emphasis. Our will acknowledges constraining factors because only so can it attain its ends. Nature embodies my will even when it seems to resist it. 'The Ought, as such, is never merely foreign to my will.'²⁶ Facts, also, 'are never *merely* Other, or "stubborn," or "compulsory." My will is never compelled merely by what is foreign to itself. It always cooperates in its own compulsion. . . . What we experience is . . . always our own will to be compelled by the facts.'²⁷ Just as I know only

²⁶ The World and the Individual, vol. II, p. 35.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 29-30.

my own ideas, which are also the ideas of a larger Self, so the external world has meaning only as it expresses my unexpressed purpose. Thus my will is not an aimless or capricious drive but a purpose conditioned from the start by an object which ever more clearly reveals itself. Royce professes indifference as to the causes, psychological or other, which determine our purposes. He is content simply to report his own observation that will itself is of this nature. Causes themselves are but expressions of rational purposes. Indeed the principle of sufficient reason we accept only through 'the Ought, whose deepest basis lies in our fundamental assurance that all reality embodies purpose.'²⁸ . . . Seeming reasonable means seeming to fulfil a purpose.' One can deny this fundamental Ought only by appealing to it. Here Royce emerges upon familiar neo-Kantian ground. 'All logical discussion is, in fact, appeal to a norm, and a norm is a teleological standard.'²⁸ Logic implies a standard which implies a will, and conversely, we must judge from Royce's whole argument, a will cannot exist except in reference to a norm. A bad will is nothing, in itself, but is something to be included and made good in the Absolute. Evil is good — to overcome. 'To sin is *consciously to choose to forget*, through a narrowing of the field of attention, an Ought that one already recognizes.'²⁹ While I see the Ought I pursue it, but through voluntary inattention I can freely choose to forget it. 'All sin, then, is sin against the light by a free choice to be inattentive to the light already seen.'²⁹ Again we have will defined as potentially good and as operating in conditions which make goodness intrinsic to its work as will.

We have come to this point in the analysis of our problem. The crying need of our time, practical, metaphysical, religious, is that of finding a relationship between desire and standard of such a sort that the desire can be brought under the control of the standard through the fact of our awareness of the relation between the two. Royce offers us such a relation in his suggestion that the will is not merely an empirical phenomenon but also a drive which operates within a framework which is conditioned by absolute principles. But we observe a certain in-

²⁸ Ibid., p. 38.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 359.

stability in the relation in that through his attempt to take account of a pragmatic voluntarism Royce makes ideas into wills and the Absolute into a Supreme Will and thus introduces an arbitrary note which seems out of place in an idealistic scheme. Yet the absolutistic quality is not omitted, and, so far as it is stressed, we seem to have that for which we are looking. The question which we must raise here is whether it was necessary for Royce to accept so much empiricistic teaching in order to make the emphasis he wished. Must the real, that is to say, be experienced as the content of the will of the Absolute or of the individual? Might not a logical realism of the type, say, of Plato or of such modern mathematicians as C. S. Peirce or Bertrand Russell have provided the absolutistic setting which Royce desired?

Clearly Royce felt that this was not possible. He is definitely an empiricist and his affirmation that the real is experienced is emphatic. 'Beyond experience there is, if anything, *further experience*.' ³⁰ And by this he means concrete experience, and not the mere possibility. In *The World and the Individual* he brings all his dialectical skill to bear on the refutation of what he calls 'Critical Rationalism,' which defines the real as that which under given conditions *could* be known.³¹ A mere possibility of experience is nothing. That which makes our ideas valid must itself be far wealthier than a mere possibility.³² A possibility is a universal, a 'what.' The real is an individual 'that.'

Yet one feels that the dialectic falters at times. In *Lectures on Modern Idealism* he argues ³³ that we accept as valid for our thought the data of human experience as a whole, though we ourselves can never experience all these data. Thus 'we accept as human experience what certain social tests require us to regard as validly reported, as significantly related to our own observation, as such that it is reasonable to view this as experience, although we ourselves do not directly verify the fact that it is experience. Our conception of human experience is, there-

³⁰ *The Conception of God*, p. 165.

³¹ Vol. I, p. 196.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 269.

³³ Pp. 238-239.

fore, itself no directly verifiable concept. . . . I am merely pointing out,' he says further, 'that no criticism of the faith that customarily guides men can reduce it to a purely empirical test; because no empirical test can be applied unless we use some form of faith, some sentiment of rationality, in terms of which we define and accept something or other as constituting the experience of mankind.' Again, in the essay on *The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Discussion*³⁴ he argues for 'certain truths which, for every one of us, transcend empirical verification, but which we none the less regard as absolutely true.' In neither case is it clear that the argument points necessarily to the experience of an Absolute Self. The first instance implies a postulate, justified by pragmatism, common sense, and social usage, of the experience of others. The second implies certain laws by which judgments are formed. In both cases we have an argument for the *a priori*³⁵ and for the Kantian view that we impose laws upon our world. And in both cases the absolutism is that of the requirements set for judgments which aim to be true.

Indeed, as we follow the course of Royce's thought, the more realistic, in a Platonic sense, does it become, and the less clear is the affinity of its essential argument with the Hegelian view of an all-embracing consciousness. In spite of his assertions that the real must be actually experienced one finds suggestions that the universal or the formal principle or the common quality may be defined as experienceable rather than as experienced. One is forced to raise the question whether this would not have been clearer if Royce had been more inclined to do justice to the realist's view of the meaning of external relations and of the independently real object. For example, Royce says that on a realistic basis where two terms seem to share a common quality there can be no actual sharing because of the independence and separateness which realism must attribute to all terms. Suppose, says Royce, you have two men sharing a common quality, manhood. If one man drowns, on the realistic hypothesis no change need occur in the other man. But since manhood is drowned

³⁴ William James and Other Essays, p. 237.

³⁵ Cf. Lectures on Modern Idealism, p. 253.

with the drowned man and yet saved with the survivor we should say, realistically speaking, that the drowned and the survivor are the same.³⁶ This extraordinary logic Royce imputes to the realist apparently because he (Royce) is unable to see how relations can be external. The fact is that the realist is of course contending merely for the independence of the quality. It does not need to pass away in the death of an object which bears it, and it does not need the life of a bearer for its own subsistence. No more, a realist would say, does possible experience imply an Absolute Self. The thing which I do not now know is a case in point. 'The object of which I know that I am ignorant,' says the realist,³⁷ is simply 'a present reality of which, in some cases, I may have a future experience.'

The approach to realism becomes the more clear as we observe that the will is controlled by rules of which it only gradually becomes aware. Will, we recall, is meaning, individuality, purpose.³⁸ There is no reality without will, but strongly suggested by the argument is also the statement that there is no will without an implied reason. Will, when completely developed, is the will to truth or to fulness of being. The real must be of the nature of will and must embody meaning, but as such it cannot avoid reference to that which makes meaning possible. The real is then the fulfilment of a will which operates toward truth in accordance with the standards by which truth is made possible, i.e., the absolute standards of logic. Reality, that is to say, is the fulfilment of purposes which conform to the rules of the game. And the rules of the game are absolute.

Royce is specific on this last point. In his own words:³⁹ 'Whatever actions are such, whatever types of action are such, whatever results of activity, whatever conceptual constructions are such, that the very act of getting rid of them, or of thinking them away, logically implies their presence, are known to us indeed both empirically and pragmatically; but they are also

³⁶ *The World and the Individual*, vol. I, p. 130. Cf. W. P. Montague, Professor Royce's Refutation of Realism, *Philosophical Review*, vol. XI, p. 53.

³⁷ D. C. Macintosh, *The Problem of Knowledge*, p. 387 n.

³⁸ *The World and the Individual*, vol. I, p. 40.

³⁹ Art., *The Principles of Logic in Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, vol. I, p. 122.

absolute. And any account which succeeds in telling what they are has absolute truth. Such truth is a "construction" or "creation," for activity determines its nature. It is "found," for we observe it when we act.' Elsewhere Royce expresses the same idea by saying that the will determines for itself forms of action which are objectively valid and absolute because to attempt to inhibit them is to act in accordance with them. What we know of these principles is, he admits, relative to our needs and activities. To this extent pragmatism is correct. But all relative human knowledge is defined in terms of principles which are absolute. Empirical truth is relative, but all relative truth is subject to absolutistic conditions. Thinking is thus carried on within an absolute framework insofar as we discover certain aspects of our activity which sustain themselves in and through the attempt to inhibit them. To say, for example, that there is no difference between yes and no is to say no, and therefore to distinguish between them in the act of denying the distinction. An absolute truth is one whose denial involves its own assertion.⁴⁰

Here Royce answers our question as to the relation of empirical will to formal standard and does it in a way which is compatible with a realistic view. The world of ideas which Plato despaired of bringing out of its isolation and 'awful unmeaningness,' and which Aristotle made operative only by denying its separateness from the empirical world, is by Royce made into a set of formal principles which yet give us information about actuality. Good Kantian that he is in many respects, Royce does here bridge the gulf which separates the laws of thought from the facts of existence. In the first place he implies, as we have observed, that an empirical will cannot exist without reference to absolute principles, and therefore that existence is hemmed about by absolute factors, is what it is because they are what they are. In the next place he affirms that our universal judgments in logic, though they deal with hypothetical situations, and though they do not tell us what the real world contains, do tell us what it does not contain. To say that all A is B is to say that the world contains no objects that are A's and

⁴⁰ William James and Other Essays, pp. 246 ff.

are not B's. Indirectly these judgments thus throw light on existential fact.⁴¹ It is true that this light does not reach very far, and that is why the mathematical will never supplant the empirical sciences.⁴² But Royce allows himself more leeway in *The Problem of Christianity* where he affirms that deductive reasoning gives us 'facts.' As Peirce showed, genuine deduction gives us much more than is contained in the premises and may lead to the discovery of an infinite number of new truths.⁴³ Interpretation, involved in deduction, is a means to fact. Also, 'the result of an interpretation may be absolutely true because, for whatever reason, the interpretation counsels the one who makes the interpretation to do some determinate and individual deed. . . . But deeds once done are irrevocable.'⁴⁴ Further, 'if anyone wants to be in touch with the "Absolute" . . . let him simply do any individual deed whatever and then try to undo that deed. Let the experiment teach him what one means by calling reality absolute. Let the truths which that experience teaches any rational being show him also what is meant by absolute truth.'⁴⁵ 'This distinction between the truth and falsity of an opinion that counsels an individual deed is as absolute and irrevocable as is the place of the deed when once done on the score of the game of life.'⁴⁶ And finally, the absoluteness of the situation where a truth is affirmed in our attempt to deny it, shows us the far-reaching influence of this absolutistic form in which our willing and thinking are carried on. The result is not mere 'analysis' as Kant held, nor is it a truth independent of our constructive processes, as Russell believes. It is 'Absolute Truth about the nature of the creative will in terms of which we conceive all truths.'⁴⁷ We all partake in an Absolute Nature. 'And it is for the sake of winning some adequate expression of this our absolute nature that we are constantly striving in our empirical world for a success which we can never obtain at any instant, and can never adequately define in any merely relative

⁴¹ *The World and the Individual*, vol. I, p. 274.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 280.

⁴³ Vol. II, p. 197.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁴⁵ *Sources of Religious Insight*, p. 154.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁴⁷ *William James and Other Essays*, p. 248.

terms. The result appears in our ethical search for absolute standards and in our metaphysical thirst for an absolute interpretation of the universe, — a thirst as unquenchable as the over-individual will that expresses itself through all our individual activities is itself world-wide, active, and in its essence absolute.’⁴⁸

At this point Royce touches the center of the religious problem. The will is the datum. But the will is conditioned by the absolute. Royce is thus giving us a philosophical statement of what we have always known through religious experience. Our religious experience of the absolute claim is but the heightened consciousness of that which is implied in our wilful life. It is because the world contains absolutes for which we can thirst that meaning comes into our lives, and it is because our thirst is a matter of living, empirical, psychological fact that we can find a bridge connecting the real with the ideal. The problem, expressed in Royce’s terms, is the problem of relating the ‘whats’ or internal meanings, inner purposes and qualities which are real for the individual self, to the external meanings or ‘thats’ which form the factual world. For Royce the problem is finally resolved in terms of an absolute mind, but we need not follow him to this conclusion in order to see that the picture he has drawn of the living will expressing itself within an absolute framework and expressing an absolute thirst for the absolute principle is one which reflects our major religious concern at the present time. The problem for the religious philosophy of the present is Royce’s problem of relating the world of postulates to the world of assurances, or James’s problem of relating competitive drives and interests to an arbiter which shall be known by the test of survival though its right to arbitrate may not be exhausted by that test. It is indeed the old Platonic problem of man’s relation to those ideal elements in things by virtue of which judgments about them are true, and the newer Kantian problem of human response to that which binds in a categorical way. In our own day the problem is attacked in the attempt to discover material content in *a priori* forms and to see how an experience of the universal and absolute is as natural and

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 252.

justifiable as an experience of fact. The religious search for 'that which holds good no matter what' is in line with this philosophical quest. As Royce shows, the clearest case of the existence of absolutes which impinge upon the domain of everyday life is seen in the existence of categorical propositions such that 'you implicitly affirm them by your very attempt at denial.' The life of the intellect with its absolutistic net of consistency furnishes us with the best illustrations of what these absolutes are like. But our aesthetic and moral experiences have their own inescapable conditions, presupposed in our experiences of preference. Religion would unite all these in devotion to the absolute value. Religious experience is an awareness, more acute at some times than at others, of the presence of such absolute norms. In this sense religious experience makes use of an *a priori* category⁴⁹ since it is an apprehension of that which brings validity, of that which is necessary for experience instead of dependent on it. In this sense also religion is an experience of form rather than content, an awareness of the presence of the binding relationship rather than of a datum for sense. It is not amenable to the standardizations of science and is never completely shareable, but is rather 'what the individual does with his own solitariness.'⁵⁰

If this be a tenable view we shall expect to find hints of agreement in the various arts and sciences of our time. Actually we do discover instances of a growing understanding of the part which form plays in controlling content. The new realisms in literature and art which give us brittleness of style, vivid contrasts in color, polytonality in the scale, are but attempts to show that the formal element is most influential when most subtly disguised. In science the notion of the field of force is suggestive. We are now told that energies, including light, do what they do because of the structure or geometry of the field in which they move. 'The course of bodies in space is determined — not by the action at a distance of those bodies, but by the structure of the cosmic field.'⁵¹ In biology the form-

⁴⁹ Cf. A. Nygren, *Die Gültigkeit der religiösen Erfahrung*.

⁵⁰ A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 16.

⁵¹ J. E. Boodin, *Three Interpretations of the Universe*, pp. 143-144.

giving tendency of our native endowment is re-emphasized, especially in the experiments on embryos which show the extent to which the graft is determined by its inherited structure. Anthropology reveals also the effect of environmental factors on the production of racial types. Physics insists that the electron is what it is because of the magnetic field in which it is found. Though the difference between a law of nature and a law of thought is obvious it still can be claimed that the emphasis in these sciences on the influence of the whole in forming the parts which it includes is in line with Royce's emphasis on the effect which the formal framework exerts on the individual wills which operate within its sphere of influence.

If Royce strikes a modern note in his stress on the influence of the total environment he has also an answer for the attack on religion based on the genetic description of mind. The naturalistic attempt to make mind continuous with nature on nature's terms is the most important challenge faced by the religious view of the world in modern times. Opposing it Royce would claim that the knowing process is not one way of functioning which the body possesses among others, but that it is the culminating activity in the light of which the others must be understood. It brings the possibility of disinterestedness and of adjustment to other claims than those of the body. Royce agrees with Bradley that the intended subject of every judgment is Reality.⁵² The act of judgment has always its relation to the real world. This, combined with the view that every experience of value presupposes a judgment of value, which in turn presupposes an absolute network of relations by which it is validated, must always remain a bulwark of the anti-naturalistic position. The account of the process whereby we reach judgments does not, after all, tell us what we mean when we judge, any more than the fact that an experience occurs enables us to tell whether it was good that it should occur. Royce is, indeed, more successful in his general emphasis than in his detailed account of the ways in which his view can be squared with natural science. Examples of the latter are his attempt to show how sexual generation in biology is analogous to conscious imitation

⁵² *The World and the Individual*, vol. I, p. 271.

in intellectual procedure,⁵³ or that the evolution of selves in nature is like that of plans in conscious life, or that matter is really mind since the two share certain irreversible processes like growth, also tendencies to communication, and to the adoption of rhythms and formation of habits. But here again one does not need to follow Royce in his view that all is mind or all is the embodiment of will to feel that he has made a contribution in his stress on the ontological status of the formal elements in mind and the normative determinants of will.

We are forced to the same conclusion when we face the problem of evil. It is at this point and over his cavalier treatment of realism that the criticism of Royce has raged most fiercely. Plainly Royce involved himself in contradictions when he said that my suffering, by inclusion with other experiences, could be the Absolute's triumph. As others have remarked, the addition of experiences must always mean a process of subtraction. I suffer because I cannot see the final good. The Absolute by definition sees the final good, but by the same token he cannot suffer. Royce's chief illustration, that of the synthesis in the Absolute's mind which is like the synthesis of the notes of a melody, fails to convince us. We can find unity in the melody because the composer put it there. A similar unity in the events of world history is what the argument should prove and not assume. But again the difficulty comes in the exaggeration of Royce's voluntaristic-empiricistic emphasis. If to be real means to be the embodiment of a purpose, then all reality must finally be the embodiment of the Absolute purpose. And if a normative principle to be effective must be constantly experienced by the Absolute mind, then departures from the norm must similarly find a place in this mind. But mind means purposeful unity, and therefore failures and bad wills cannot achieve the same final status with good wills. Santayana made a dent in Royce's armor when he said Royce believed that it was really right that things should be wrong, but really wrong not to try to right them. If we limit the term absolute to that by which the act is judged we can retain the latter half of the aphorism while rejecting the former. Furthermore, no sketch of Royce should

⁵³ *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 315-316.

leave unnoticed the fact that to accuse him of indifference to suffering is grossly unfair. Any critic who holds this position should read the essay on *The Problem of Job* in *Studies of Good and Evil* and ponder the eloquence of Royce's protest against all talk of medicinal and disciplinary evil as 'cruelly, even cynically trivial.' If, as a voluntarist, Royce turned to absolutism to make his voluntarism intelligible, one feels that he also as a religious man turned to absolutism to make evil interpretable. The problem of evil is not solved by saying, with the pluralist, that evil is not good. The right to ignore it is bought at too high a price. Absolute idealism does at least try to meet the problem on its own terms by treating evil as that which must be overcome, in theory as in practice. If its own theory fails, it keeps us, in any event, from blindness to the exigencies of the situation. Royce helps us to see that the path toward the solution points to a greater stress on values in their structural and absolutistic quality as norms for our action, and to less regard for the will and power which we see so often to fail.

Finally, we can only applaud Royce's heroic attempt toward the end of his life in *The Problem of Christianity* to show the mutual dependence of absolute and empirical by making the Absolute Spirit embody itself in the principle of interpretation as carried on by the Beloved Community. In this move we find much that is congenial to our age. Recent psychology has shown how true it is that the self is a community; recent sociology has shown how dependent for the truth we are upon what the community understands to be the truth. We may balk at the extreme view that our logic is socially conditioned, but we are forced to accept the idea that our insight into what we believe to be logical is in part dependent on what society thinks. The questions which we would ask Royce at this point are similar to those asked before. Here again Royce describes the Beloved Community but he does not describe the primitive community ruled by jealousy and fear rather than love, nor the totalitarian state which is based on persecution. But his description of the ideal society does bring out the fact that the social like the individual will operate in the light of factors which are ideal. Royce takes account, we feel, of evil, but does

not show why there must be this particular evil; he gives us a principle of loyalty, but does not show what we should be loyal to; he sets up a Beloved Community, but does not explain its relation to communism and fascism. Yet we know that his answer would be that the philosopher, as critic of life, is concerned with the ideal and the valid and cannot be expected to do more than to show what it is, trusting that if its vision is once attained it will finally become all-engrossing. A certain abstractionism is perhaps inherent in the philosopher's task. He uses words, arguments, ideas which reflect upon the stream of life and divert it into new channels, but cannot be the same as life itself. As the colors in the picture are 'unbelievable,' because they are set apart in a frame in the gallery, and miss nature's surrounding panorama, so for the philosopher complete realism is impossible because of the medium in which he works. The calm vision of Apollo is removed from the urgency of Dionysos's instinctive desires. Religion is interested not in life so much as in the good life or the life which is ordered and controlled. And Royce by showing the participation of the Beloved Community in the eternal ideas has given us an insight into the essential meaning of religion which is none the less profound because its details are not at present wholly clear.

We think of Royce and James as representing the two opposing schools of idealism and realism, — Royce insisting that philosophy be critical and subject all life to the laws of mind, James claiming that we should take experience as it comes, whether or not it conforms to what we think it ought to be. But we should see that both men had inner conflicts over this issue. Royce was as much voluntarist as he was idealist, taking the will as his starting point and concerning himself with the conditions under which the will must work. James, on the other hand, with all his professed interest in pluralism, had his moments when the Absolute, especially when viewed as the Ultimate, seemed the natural goal of thought and experience. And with all his pragmatic abandon, and his profession of willingness to let ideas fight out their validity among themselves and prove themselves true by making themselves able to survive, we know that James adopted his own ideas of value on the basis of

his vivid spiritual intuition into the nature of the absolutely good. Ideas and ideals may have come out of life and the struggle for existence, but having come they point to a realm of disinterested truth. The difficulty in reconciling the purposive and the critical has been bequeathed by Royce and James to their successors. Personalism, which has drawn much from Royce, aims to synthesize idealism and empiricism, but its synthesis expresses itself as vacillation between the one and the many. Religious realism formulates the religious problem in terms of a critical epistemology, yet discovers before it is done that religious knowledge lies in the sphere of the will and of value. The word 'humanism' is today invoked by one school to justify an appeal to transcendental standards, by another to sanction a plunge into the empirical flux.

The problem is still with us simply because it reflects a dualism which is elemental. Especially for religion is it acute since religion must ever protest against the world of things as they are. In the attempt to work out a religious philosophy two courses are open to us. We may adopt the empirical way and insist on taking the world as it comes, but then we are faced with the difficulty of deriving the lure of the normative from the actual drives which we find within us. Or we may make criticism and normative evaluation primary and refuse to accept any interpretation of the world which does not reflect the light of the eternal. The empiricist will always have the advantage of concreteness and definiteness in the application of his principles to practical problems. But philosophy, like religion, has ever been wary of the merely articulate, and has ever striven to explain that permanent element in experience which makes application itself a consistent procedure.

If, then, we say that American philosophy of religion begins with a Roycean absolute and uses it as a background, we must say also that it is forced to return to absolutes of the Roycean type to explain its own work of criticism and make it effective. Analysis must heed the principles of identity and contradiction, action must conform to what is antecedently right if its end is to be good, and religious experience must isolate and worship that which distinguishes the desirable from the actually desired.

If this is to be done life must, as Simmel has said, ever seek to be more than life. Speculative philosophy, as Professor Whitehead reminds us,⁵⁴ must guard 'our higher intuitions from base alliances by its suggestions of ultimate meanings, disengaged from the facts of current modes of behavior.' And religion must render clear to popular understanding some eternal greatness incarnate in the passage of temporal fact.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 30.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

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